What will Croatia–Serbia relations look like after Vučić?

The change of government in Serbia has largely been met with relief in Croatia. DW’s interviewees see an opportunity for better relations, but warn of unresolved issues and the domestic political appetite in Croatia for keeping tensions alive.

The political shift in Serbia sparked mostly positive comments in Croatia, accompanied by a degree of restraint from far-right actors. Representatives of the Student List and the election winners were promptly congratulated by Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković and Foreign Minister Goran Grlić Radman. Messages of goodwill were also sent by the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Možemo! party, and the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS). Plenković spoke by phone with the head of the Student List, Ilija Srdanović, and expressed his expectation to the media that relations between Croatia and Serbia would now take a turn for the better. He assessed the election winners’ initial messages as mostly moderate and rational.

A visible relaxation was also evident in the demeanor of SDSS President Milorad Pupovac, given the relative tension that had prevailed between the former Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and the representatives of Serbs in Croatia. Vučić certainly complemented other political figures in Croatia far more harmoniously. These were primarily right-leaning figures and organisations with whom he shared an indirect yet convenient interest in stoking friction between Serbs and Croats in general. Such conflict often suited the current Croatian government as well, as a means of diverting public attention from domestic problems and its own accountability.

The regrettable role of Brussels

“Apart from a segment of the right, there has been a widespread sense of relief across the region following Vučić’s downfall,” noted Božo Kovačević, former Croatian diplomat and politician, now a commentator on international political relations, speaking to DW. He added that creating friction was Vučić’s standard mode of operation, whether in relation to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Montenegro.

On the other hand, Kovačević pointed out that the distinct stance of the student opposition was all the more noticeable. “They made it very clear that they wish to normalise relations with their neighbours, although we do not yet know how they themselves will respond to key foreign policy challenges.” “I assume that domestically they will insist on the consistent application of the rule of law. We have yet to see how their relationship with the EU and particularly Kosovo will develop. Regarding relations with the EU, however, I must regretfully say that Brussels backed Vučić over more progressive currents,” Kovačević said.

He recalled that the EU failed to offer stronger support to Zoran Đinđić and Boris Tadić in the past, whilst standing virtually unreservedly behind Vučić and Tomislav Nikolić. Therefore, the DW commentator considers a certain degree of detachment towards the EU on the part of the student movement to be understandable. “Ultimately, the citizens of Serbia will have to decide for themselves what they think of the EU and their country’s position relative to it. The job of the new administration will be to act accordingly,” he believes, “and it would be a major mistake if anyone attempted to pressure the public on this matter in either direction. As for Kosovo, I think a great deal of wisdom will be required to enable even a basic normalisation of ties.”

Kovačević highlighted that whilst Kosovo is defined by the Serbian constitution as part of Serbia, more normal relations could still be built without constitutional amendments.

A more effective order of priorities

When asked about Croatia currently acting as a sort of “gatekeeper” to EU membership for neighbouring countries such as Montenegro and Serbia, he replied that past mistakes should not be repeated. “Following the political fall of Milo Đukanović, Croatia began presenting Montenegro – specifically its new, conditionally speaking, pro-Serbian administration – with relatively heavy demands that it had never placed on Đukanović, even though it was Đukanović who personally took part in the aggression against Croatia 35 years ago. I hope they will be wiser and more principled in the case of Serbia, but let us not jump to premature optimism,” said the analyst. Croatia needs to establish its priorities more effectively because, in his view, there are problems that are solvable, others that are difficult to resolve, and some that are intractable, at least for now. However, solving the intractable issues must not be set as a prerequisite for tackling the rest.

“Furthermore, when discussing the need to determine the fate of those missing from the Homeland War, it is clear that Croatia must press for a resolution, but not quite in this manner. For years now, it has been regularly swept under the carpet, both at the highest levels of government and more broadly, that many of those roughly 1,700 missing individuals are actually ethnic Serbs,” Kovačević observed. More specifically, by the middle of the last decade, people ceased acknowledging that Serbs from Croatia make up approximately 40 per cent of those missing from that war. It is Croatia, rather than Serbia, that ought to know about their fate and mortal remains. Previously, this detail was included alongside the total figure, but since the HDZ returned to power in early 2016, it has largely been glossed over.

Politicians’ need for tension

Nikola Vukobratović, president of the Serb Cultural Society Prosvjeta in Zagreb, remains sceptical about whether certain political forces will change their habits simply due to a change of government in Serbia. “Unfortunately, I do not believe that a change of power in Serbia will in itself reduce the need among politicians in Croatia to play up inter-ethnic and inter-state tensions, as that need stems from domestic rather than foreign policy motives. If anything, the initial days following the Serbian elections demonstrated that many politicians in Croatia, and by no means only those on the right, feel compelled to ‘warn’ against the new government before it has even been formed,” the president of Prosvjeta told DW. In his view, perhaps the new administration in Serbia will at least feel more secure following such a decisive victory.

 (Danas, 30.10.2026)

https://www.danas.rs/svet/dw-odnosi-hrvatske-i-srbije-posle-vucica/

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