By Rade Veljanovski
Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Political Sciences
Kosovo has acquired countless narratives, ranging from “the heart of Serbia” to “so-called Kosovo”. Approaches to this phenomenon are shaped by identity, historical covenants, tradition, religion, politics and ideology, and only rarely by realism and objectivity.
As with many other issues over the past forty years, the causes are suppressed, the consequences emphasised, and conclusions drawn from an undesirable outcome about who is a patriot, who is a traitor, and on whom the blame should be placed for things not being as people would like them to be.
One of the most dangerous approaches is the claim that “some people want to hand over Kosovo, recognise its independence, and justify the seizure of part of Serbia’s territory”. Such accusations are most often generated by those in power, but they are echoed by parts of the opposition, which accuse the authorities themselves of bearing responsibility because they are not doing enough to reintegrate Kosovo into Serbia.
In this way, the essence of the issue is obscured, the real responsibility and those who bear it are concealed, divisions are deepened, and disappointing outcomes emerge, such as the recent student Memorandum on Kosovo and Metohija, which begins by describing the territory as “an inalienable and integral part of Serbia”, despite the fact that it has been separated and has not been an integral part of Serbia for 26 years.
Let us step away for a moment from the origins of the problem and try to imagine the fulfilment of the dream of Serbia’s territorial integrity. Territorial integrity, yes, of course. Not the shared life of Serbs and Albanians in one state, because who would wish for such a thing, except for a handful of naïve groups and individuals supposedly misled by Yugoslavism, as professional patriots would put it.
Serbia has around six and a half million voters, while Kosovo has approximately 2.1 million. Kosovo has about 120,000 Serbian voters, while just over 60,000 Albanians live in Serbia. Thus, a reintegrated Serbia would have around eight and a half million voters, of whom almost a quarter would be ethnic Albanians. And what would be the problem with that? None at all, if this were a genuinely democratic state in which different peoples lived together as equals, with mutual respect, building a multi-ethnic, pro-European civic community in which everyone enjoyed equal rights and obligations and no one threatened anyone else. But if the state had been such a place, its disintegration would never have occurred.
Can one reasonably assume that the Albanian electorate in a unified state would be as fragmented and divided as the Serbian electorate is today? Kosovo has several Albanian political parties, but in the event of reintegration into Serbia, the first unpleasant possibility might be the political homogenisation of both Albanians and Serbs, with each voting against the other in elections. Such a situation would certainly not contribute to stability or harmonious coexistence. Yet this is not the only issue overlooked by increasingly fervent advocates of state and territorial unity.
Most of those who long for Serbia’s territorial integrity not out of a desire for coexistence but because of Kosovo-related myths, nationalism and a desire for historical revenge would never again set foot inside the National Assembly building. Around two million Albanian voters, potentially united behind a single electoral list, could become the strongest electoral competitor, given that fewer than 1.8 million voters supported the winning coalition, Serbia Must Not Stop, in the 2023 parliamentary elections.
Albanian political actors would probably not be able to win power outright, but it is difficult to imagine anyone governing without them. Their representatives would hold between a quarter and a third of the seats in parliament, and a similar proportion would have to be represented in the government and other institutions. At least one deputy prime minister and three or four ministers would likely be Albanian.
And that is not all. Significant property belonging to Albanians who once owned bakeries, confectioneries and other small businesses throughout Serbia would have to be returned to them. Albanian would become an official language of Serbia. Once again, we return to the question: what would be the problem with that if the state were democratic and if there were an understanding that this is precisely how things ought to be? But…
The lack of experience with multi-party democracy in Serbia before Kosovo’s separation, because the wars that ultimately led to secession began precisely when participatory democracy was formally restored, has lulled advocates of reintegration into believing that restoring territorial unity would provide an opportunity for the majority nation to dominate the minority across the entire territory. They fail to understand that restoring Kosovo and Metohija as an autonomous province could not confine Albanian political influence to that territory alone. Their influence would extend to decision-making throughout Serbia, to a greater extent than ever existed in either the Kingdom of Yugoslavia or socialist Yugoslavia.
There is no doubt that advocates of reintegration do not want this outcome, but neither do they think about it. What matters to them is the mythical and historical control of territory. That is why they speak of territorial integrity rather than of living together. In their view, “our people” in Kosovo are only the Serbs, while everyone else should submit to the will of the majority.
Another fact is often forgotten. No one, apart from a large number of Kosovo Albanians, wanted the former southern province to secede from Serbia. Serbian traditionalists and nationalists opposed it for obvious reasons, while others believed that, despite problems, isolated conflicts and various grievances, coexistence could be maintained.
Today, one of the greatest manipulations is to accuse Yugoslavists and other civically minded individuals of justifying Kosovo’s separation or contributing to it. These were precisely the people who supported coexistence – not as a burden, but as something normal. They did not generate hatred and intolerance; they sought to preserve a common life. The paradox of attitudes towards Kosovo lies in the fact that those who viewed – and continue to view – with pronounced hostility the population that vastly outnumbers others are the same people demanding the restoration of territorial integrity.
Amid forgotten facts, distorted memories and the inexperience of those born after the 1990s, there has emerged a conviction that Serbian authority over Kosovo can be restored if only everyone in Serbia unites behind that goal. Such thinking absolves the Serbian regime of the late 1980s and 1990s of responsibility for causing Kosovo’s separation. It also ignores the fact that the current government, which is a continuation of Milošević-era politics, participated in and contributed to that division.
No one, therefore, can be satisfied with the present situation – not even Kosovo Albanians, because although they achieved independence, much in their society still does not function properly. This reality, unpleasant for everyone, cannot be changed by the will of one side alone, whether political or, especially, through the use of force.
Appeals to the Constitution are of little help, because our own experience demonstrates that a Constitution is no guarantee of preserving a state. Yugoslavia had a constitution, yet it collapsed. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro also had a constitution, and it too dissolved. Kosovo, for that matter, has its own constitution, which says something entirely different, and Albanians must also be consulted regarding any future changes.
The issue is not whether Kosovo’s independence should be recognised or not. The real issue is objectively confronting the consequences for which many bear responsibility, least of all those who simply accept reality. Those who argue that the only viable solution is for both states to join the European Union are probably closest to the truth. Such a development would erase borders and encourage the rebuilding of trust and cooperation – provided that the current democratic backsliding on both sides allows it, and provided that the international situation does not descend into complete uncertainty.
(Radar, 03.06.2026)
https://radar.nova.rs/drustvo/realnost-kosova-nikoga-ne-raduje/