The state funeral granted to Ratko Mladić has reopened the debate on the unresolved relationship between modern Serbia, nationalism, and the wars of the 1990s. The past is not being processed: it is becoming collective guilt.
By Biagio Carrano
The mural dedicated to Mladić in Njegoševa Street in downtown Belgrade, repeatedly defaced by activists.Ratko Mladić died on 27 August 2026, aged 84, in the prison hospital in Scheveningen, where he was serving the life sentence handed down in 2017 and upheld on appeal in 2021 for the genocide at Srebrenica. On a day in September 2026, Belgrade will sink back into the 1990s. It will be the day of the state funeral of General Ratko Mladić, the butcher of Srebrenica. Funerals are usually a moment of reconciliation and reflection, but that will not be the case here.
In 1972, twenty-seven years after the end of the Second World War, hordes of Germans of all ages swarmed the Romagna Riviera. Thousands of summer romances blossomed between local youths and female German guests, while thousands of elderly couples – whose husbands had already experienced Italy roughly 30 years earlier under far less relaxed circumstances – danced the liscio in ballrooms alongside other couples of their age who, three decades prior, would not have treated them with the famous Romagna hospitality. And this was happening not only between Rimini and Riccione, but also on Lake Garda, the Ligurian Riviera, and along the Venetian coast from Grado to Cavallino. As early as the 1950s, dozens of German entrepreneurs were arriving in Prato to buy textiles produced in the “Tuscan Manchester”, while engineering and steel companies between Brescia, Bergamo, and Verona were routing thousands of lorries carrying supplies for German industry via the Brenner Pass.
During those same years, something similar was taking place on the other side of the Adriatic. Not only Hungarians and Romanians, who had also collaborated with the Nazi invaders, but also many East and West Germans were enjoying the Dalmatian and Montenegrin coasts – by then increasingly equipped to welcome foreign tourism – with Yugoslav waiters delighted by the tips they could pocket.
The Western Balkans and the mirror of Srebrenica
Try going to Zagreb today, or worse still to Split, and speaking in Ekavian – the Serbian Yugoslav pronunciation: just ten years ago in Zagreb, three of us Italians were spat at as we left a car park simply because we were driving a car with Serbian registration plates. Marko Perković Thompson, the Croatian singer who chants “kill the Serbs” together with his audience, drew 500,000 attendees to his concert at the Zagreb Hippodrome on 5 July 2025. Yes, last year, not twenty years ago. Nationalism in the Western Balkans shows no sign of abating; however, it varies from country to country depending on how politicians handle it and how much space they afford it. Among Croats, the institutionalized conflict between Plenković and Milanović pushes Ustaše revivalism into the background. And among Serbs?
The huge crowd at Marko Perković Thompson’s concert: July 5, 2025: one in eight Croats was at the event.Milorad Dodik, the dominant figure in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia since 1998, serves as an ideal barometer of the prevailing attitude among Bosnian Serbs: during his early years in power, when out of government, he declared a willingness to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal and called Mladić and Karadžić “wrongdoers”. In 2007, during a television interview with the Bosniak channel NTV Hayat, he went so far as to state that a genocide had occurred in Srebrenica. Yet, once back in power, his position shifted from 2008 onwards, leading the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska to annul the findings of the 2004 Srebrenica Inquiry Commission in 2018, subsequently claiming it was a myth and that the number of victims had been greatly inflated.
Why is Srebrenica so important? Srebrenica is not merely a memorial of white pillars for the more than 8,000 men and boys killed in July 1995; it is the epitome of the unresolved relationship the Serbian political class has with the wars of the 1990s.
Post-war Germany: a contradictory yet successful reckoning with history
How have two ruling classes, separated by two generations, managed the legacy of their past?
Let us go back eighty years. In 1945, Germany was not only a defeated country, but one reduced in land mass by a quarter (from roughly 470,000 square kilometres to around 357,000), carrying 14 million refugees from regions of historically German culture that were irrecoverably lost – at least half a million of whom lost their lives during transit due to disease or violence by local populations: ideal conditions for revanchist drives.
The distinction between Nazis and Germans (largely forced, as Goldhagen argued in his classic and controversial text Hitler’s Willing Executioners) allowed the German public to accept the historical guilt of the Holocaust by condemning an ideology rather than condemning themselves as a people. Senior Nazi officials were tried and sentenced by a tribunal located in Nuremberg, but by Allied judges, not German ones. The most visible evil was physically eliminated through 10 hangings and Göring’s suicide.
Much more slowly, the processing of collective guilt took root through the arts, educational curricula, and political ideologies – ranging from liberals in the West to communists in the East (one need only think of Brecht) – which did not exempt the German people from reflecting on their faults. As late as 1949, a majority of Germans still viewed Nazism as “a good idea badly executed”, with as many as 68% of liberal voters holding this view. Just a few years after the catastrophe, nostalgia for Nazism remained strong and denazification had barely begun. Yet nostalgic instincts found no representation among political leaders who had themselves been persecuted by the regime; if anything, their pragmatism allowed tens of thousands of Nazi Party members to benefit from amnesties and re-enter the state apparatus in both Germanies – not only because they were necessary for reconstruction, but also, as Adenauer stated, because it served to neutralize a “growing and increasingly extremist nationalism” that was re-emerging.
Source: Limes, 6/24: https://www.limesonline.com/rivista/premiere/la-germania-senza-qualita-il-numero-624-di-limes-16333100/The reintegration of segments of the population who had actively supported Nazism did not alter the core policies – including educational ones – that acknowledged Germany’s guilt in unleashing the war and carrying out the Holocaust. Critical analysis of the past, recognition of guilt, the reshaping of national values, and compensatory actions in both domestic and foreign policy: the German path (today being challenged by the rise of the AfD) remains, despite all its limits and contradictions, the single greatest achievement by a European nation in accepting the consequences of its guilt and reframing its principles and values.
An unresolved relationship with the 1990s
Some 81 years after the end of the Second World War and 31 years after the Dayton Agreement, can we say that a social, political, and cultural process similar to that of post-war Germany has occurred in the Balkans, particularly in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia? Definitely not!
After a brief interlude in the early 2000s that raised hopes of overcoming past divisions, the leadership of these countries rekindled nationalism, using it as an insurance policy for their political survival.
From 2008 onwards, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has operated on a dual level of communication. In official dialogue with European nations, as well as during early election campaigns, the focus was placed on European integration as the primary path to improving the country’s living standards. To Brussels and Berlin, it presented itself as the political force capable of getting the most nationalist electorate to accept the “normalization” of relations with Kosovo – an essential condition for EU accession. At an internal level, however, within the domestic media landscape shaped by tabloids and government-aligned outlets, the shaping of public consensus was, and remains, rooted in heavily chauvinistic and revanchist messaging regarding Kosovo and the 1990s wars, paired with aggressive nationalism towards neighbouring countries.
In his meeting with the EU Representative in Serbia, Andreas von Bekerat, on October 31 2026, President Vučić confirmed that “European integration and EU accession are a strategic objective for Serbia because they are not only a geostrategic advancement but a path towards faster development for the country.”Take, for instance, a characteristic slogan of recent years: “Nema predaje” (which translates to “no surrender” or “no giving in”), the key phrase expressing the refusal of any agreement on Kosovo, widely used at SNS conventions. It matters little that Serbia has in practice conceded on virtually everything regarding Kosovo’s independence and the rights of the Serbs still residing there; what matters is feeding and motivating a nationalist electoral base, fanning the flames of revanchism, instilling in a portion of the youth a sense of dispossession and perceived injustice, rather than securing a diplomatic resolution that leads to an honourable compromise.
An unrealistic rhetoric based on grievance does nothing to change the reality on the ground, but it serves two other distinct purposes: fueling a nationalist, revanchist sentiment that views the leader as the sole protector of the nation, and, worse still, trapping an entire nation in its past.
Within this strategy of steering a segment of the electorate, Thompson’s concert in Vukovar on 28 August offered the Serbian leadership an unmissable opportunity to revitalize this approach: alarming the public over the threat of returning Nazism in the neighbouring country and fanning nationalist flames, while simultaneously portraying a sense of detachment from the European Union (of which Croatia is a member) – “not even a formal note of protest,” Vučić pointedly remarked.
For this is the vast difference between post-WWII Germany and post-Balkan Wars Serbia: the German political class worked on collective awareness of guilt while simultaneously building social cohesion and steering new generations away from the militarism and supremacism (Deutschland über alles) that had resulted in two catastrophic defeats, thereby avoiding equating an entire nation with the disastrous choices of the Nazi ruling class.
In Serbia, by contrast, the work done on public perception over more than fifteen years has served to bind the populace to the mistakes of the 1990s in an almost mystical vision of history, wherein the elites and the public are condemned to a shared destiny (naturally dictated by the elites).
The collective claim to individual liabilities: why the Mladić state funeral matters
Underpinning these strategies are far more pragmatic motives: the current Serbian political leadership was directly involved in Milošević’s decisions during the 1990s and, apart from a few timid attempts, has never challenged that chapter of their past.
Throughout the 1990s, protests against the political leadership occurred in Serbia. The photo is from the 1996 student protests under the slogan “Belgrade is the world.”There has been no critical examination of their history; no admission that the hundreds of thousands of Serbs protesting in the streets of Belgrade while the Milošević regime assisted Karadžić and Mladić were actually right; no break from the political and cultural ties to the 1990s; no desire to reshape state and civil society around values of reconciliation and historical accountability. Instead, the preference has been to ensure that the errors and horrors of the 1990s become a collective heritage, absolving the public of responsibility while exempting the elites from any political or historical accountability.
Was Srebrenica, then, a genocide? The International Court of Justice ruling in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro on 26 February 2007 classified the events at Srebrenica as genocide, but did not hold Serbia responsible for committing or being complicit in it; rather, it found Serbia guilty of failing to prevent it and of protecting the perpetrator, Mladić. Why, then, attach this stigma to the Serbs as a people? What bias lies behind this stance? From the argument laid out so far, the answer becomes clear: the people whose current leadership refuses to acknowledge the mistakes of its past and seeks to evade all accountability are people far more likely to repeat those same mistakes. Defining Srebrenica as a genocide is a stigma not for the Serbian people, but for the immaturity of its political class, which remains incapable of confronting its past without dragging the entire population into its black holes.
This is why state honours granted to a war criminal like Ratko Mladić are the clearest sign not of a pivot towards Moscow or Beijing (as commentators with minds full of cheap geopolitics suggest), but of something else, and perhaps far worse: a refusal to question national history and a mass absolution of responsibility that ultimately becomes a mass implication of guilt. This is worse than an amnesty, because an amnesty begins with the condemnation of individual past wrongdoings.
Through a state funeral for Mladić, official Serbia seeks to celebrate its survival across recent decades, even at the expense of future generations.
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