Hungarian sociologist, political scientist, and former politician Bálint Magyar, who described Hungary under former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán as a mafia state, tells N1 that it is a specific form of state capture, in which a political clique fully captures the state and manages it like a criminal organisation.
Asked to assess the situation in Serbia ahead of the elections, he points out that the difference compared to Hungary lies in the electoral system, as well as the emergence of a new force on the Serbian political scene that could contribute to change.
“In Hungary, it was extremely demanding because we had 106 single-member constituencies. We had to field 106 candidates and run ‘micro-campaigns’ in each of them. That proved to be highly successful, because people were fed up with Orbán’s regime. Out of 106 constituencies, Tisza candidates won in 96. Here, as far as I am aware – though I am not entirely certain – there are party lists, which is simpler. On the other hand, the similarity lies in the discredit of the old opposition parties. Péter Magyar had no ties to them whatsoever; in fact, he rejected any connection with the old opposition parties that were part of that criminal organisation. Here, it seems to me, three main opposition parties support the list led by students,” Bálint Magyar assesses.
He considers that a new force has appeared on the political scene in Serbia that could contribute to change.
“The question is this: given that Vučić, as far as I know, does not yet have a constitutional majority, it is likely that the opposition will not have one either, even if they win the elections. Therefore, the fight will be very difficult, even after a potential election victory. In Hungary, we are now in a better position because the changes Fidesz made to the electoral law, making it increasingly disproportionate, ultimately turned against them. As a result, the opposition – namely Tisza – has reached a position where it can now freely amend the Constitution,” he states.
Speaking about how the mafia state was established in his country, he says that “in Hungary, this was possible due to an unproportional electoral system.”
“Because of this, following the economic, moral, and political collapse of the former political parties between 2008 and 2010, the Fidesz party managed to win more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. Thus, they gained constitutional power – meaning they practically managed to monopolise political power,” Magyar explains.
He adds, however, that “this is not merely about autocracy or an attempt to establish autocracy – as was the case, for instance, in Poland.”
“Namely, in Poland, Kaczyński wanted to monopolise political power, but at the same time, that regime was driven by ideology, so it was not corrupt to that degree. In Hungary, the regime had two main goals: the monopolisation of political power and the accumulation of personal and family wealth. From that point on, the state was run as a criminal organisation, which is not simply corruption. With corruption, you can separate political actors from economic actors. But here you cannot, because there is interdependence – when the politician himself is a criminal, when there are no corrupt transactions, but simply the takeover of state assets and private companies through bloodless blackmail enabled by state power,” he highlights.
Magyar states that Hungary has experienced three regime changes over the last 30 years or so.
“The first was in 1989, moving from a communist dictatorship to a liberal democracy, along with the first Fidesz government – at that time, they did not have a two-thirds majority. That was the embryo of the mafia state because they lacked political omnipotence. The second regime change occurred in 2010, when liberal democracy became the mafia state of Hungary. And now, with these latest elections, we have achieved a new regime change – the transformation of the mafia state back into a liberal democracy. In none of these cases would I say it was a revolution, because all the regime changes were built on legal continuity, without a break in legal continuity. The paradox is that this disproportionate system granted a two-thirds majority to the new political forces, thereby enabling the dismantling of the mafia state,” he assesses.
How to dismantle the “mafia state”
When asked how the Hungarians managed to dismantle the mafia state, Magyar emphasizes that the most crucial element was creating a new language.
“The old opposition parties were part of that criminal organisation. During Fidesz rule, opposition parties were either marginalised, ‘tamed’ and corrupted, or financially ruined. In addition, Fidesz itself created fake parties. At the same time, starting from the COVID pandemic, there was economic stagnation on the one hand. On the other hand, EU funds earmarked for Hungary were suspended, leading to an economic crisis. This economic crisis was accompanied by a moral crisis. A scandal broke out – the so-called presidential pardon scandal – involving attempts to ‘wash clean’ individuals involved in paedophilia in children’s care homes. This created a vacuum of sorts: there was a demand for regime change, but no suitable offer – political offer – to fulfill it,” Magyar says.
According to him, current Prime Minister Péter Magyar practically stepped onto the stage into the vacuum that had been created and formed a new movement Tisza while all the other opposition parties effectively collapsed and could not participate in this new battle.
“Péter Magyar, through the ‘Tisza’ movement, managed to unite all those who were dissatisfied. At the same time, he called for a change of regime, not merely a change of government. The message was clear: we must destroy the mafia state and take the nation back into our own hands,” Bálint Magyar explained.
Asked about the role of the media in all of this, he points out that under Orbán, traditional media were completely captured, but social media played an exceptionally important role in changing the government.
“It is truly unusual that opposition parties, so-called political analysts, and even academic intellectuals played no real part in this regime change. Instead, a key role was played on the one hand by influencers, and on the other by investigative journalists. Péter Magyar was extremely active on social networks. Thanks precisely to this rise of social media, he posted 5, 10, or even 15 pieces of content daily, acquiring nearly two million followers,” he notes.
He also highlights that Péter Magyar held 700 rallies across the country over the last two years.
“What was particularly interesting was that he focused on smaller settlements, where older, poorer, and less educated people already formed the core base of the Fidesz party. Similarly, liberal and left-leaning voters realised that the fate of Budapest would be decided in the villages – that the fate of intellectuals would be decided by people with primary education, and the fate of the middle class by the poor. Thus, an alliance was formed in which Tisza party supporters – 43 per cent of them – identified as liberals, 22 per cent as left-wing, and only 11 per cent as right-wing conservatives,” Bálint Magyar states.
Péter Magyar united the nation
He adds that Péter Magyar’s ideology and communication were oriented towards the centre-right, while simultaneously sending signals to both liberals and right-wingers.
“In this way, he managed to unite the nation against this mafia state,” he stresses.
He points out that people united around the goal of defeating the mafia state.
“It is also very important that Péter Magyar reclaimed national symbols in his communication. It was not nationalist rhetoric, but national rhetoric – a message that Hungary is not a country that should function as a mafia state,” he states.
He highlights that Péter Magyar was the first politician to say, “This is a mafia; we must free ourselves from this mafia state.”
Asked how the dismantling of the mafia state is progressing following Péter Magyar’s victory, Bálint Magyar assesses that Hungary is perhaps in a better position than Serbia because, thanks to the two-thirds majority, it commands a constitutional majority in parliament.
“This means they can amend the Constitution, replace the heads of institutions – such as the President of the Republic, the Chief Prosecutor, or the presidents of courts – whose appointment and election otherwise require two-thirds of MPs’ votes. Therefore, I am very optimistic in that regard, because regime change in Hungary must rest on three pillars. The first is establishing a constitutional state, where introducing a proportional representation system is of key importance for the future. The second pillar is dismantling the mafia state. The third pillar is ending our dependence on Russia, given that Orbán was Putin’s client, practically blackmailed by Putin, with whom he also had suspicious dealings,” Bálint Magyar assesses.
According to him, awareness matured in Hungary that if Orbán remained in power, the country’s future would lead towards ‘Belarusification’, further alignment with Russia, increased dependence on it, and perhaps even drifting away from the European Union.
Magyar abolished state propaganda
Regarding the media, Magyar states that all state propaganda has been abolished.
“Péter Magyar’s new government does not use public funds for propaganda. As for the new public media, only a single interview with Péter Magyar has been broadcast. So, there is no daily, relentless propaganda machine. He does not even use the tools Orbán relied on, such as omnipresent billboards or continuous advertising in state media. Instead, Péter Magyar uses social networks as his primary mode of communication, which is very cheap and involves virtually no public funds,” Bálint Magyar states.
(N1, 20.10.2026)
https://n1info.rs/svet/madjarska-srbija-madjar-vucic-izbori-mafija/
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