Serbian energy sector between East and West

American sanctions, which have also targeted the Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS), majority-owned by two Russian companies, Gazprom Neft and Gazprom, have only accelerated The Belgrade’s gradual pivot away from Moscow—a process quietly initiated even before January 10. Without the U.S. sanctions on NIS, this shift would likely have taken much longer, but the Serbian government had already started paving the way for this transition, especially over the past few months.

However, the authorities avoided making loud declarations about this move, aware that a significant portion of the public remains sympathetic to Russia, whose president, Vladimir Putin, has historically been the only figure in public opinion polls to rival Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić in popularity.

In the meantime, both leaders’ approval ratings have taken a hit—Putin’s, due to the disillusionment of pro-Russian citizens who believed he would march into Kyiv within weeks, which, nearly three years after the aggression began on February 22, remains unachieved; and Vučić’s, due to his inability to handle months-long protests by students, who persistently remind him that the Serbian Constitution grants him no authority in their matters and that “no one is asking him anything” anyway.

A complicated equation with three unknowns

Their ratings could further decline if Moscow and Belgrade fail to find a mutually acceptable solution for NIS—a deal that would also need to gain U.S. approval. This presents a rather complicated equation with, as yet, three unknowns.

What is clear, however, is that 114 days before the U.S. expanded its sanctions to include NIS, the Serbian and U.S. governments signed a Strategic Cooperation Agreement in the field of energy in Washington, on September 18, 2024. Beyond the brief announcement that the agreement was signed by Serbia’s Foreign Minister and former Ambassador to Washington, Marko Đurić, and the U.S. Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, Jose Fernandez, the public was left in the dark about its substance. The only details shared by Đurić were that the agreement would “facilitate Serbia’s green transition and provide better access to clean energy,” that it marked “a significant step toward securing energy security,” that it would result in “more reliable and stable long-term energy supplies,” and that “both Serbian and U.S. energy companies, as well as citizens, would benefit from it.”

And that was essentially all the general public knew about this “strategically important agreement.” Efforts by both domestic and U.S. media to uncover more details were futile. The key points remained classified as a kind of state secret—until the Serbian government was required to submit the agreement to the National Assembly for ratification.

Although the preamble of the agreement reaffirms that Serbia and the U.S. will “nurture friendly and productive relations” and strive to “enhance bilateral energy relations,” less than three months later—and before the agreement was ratified in parliament—Washington demanded that Serbia remove Russia from NIS’s ownership structure. Hardly a “friendly” request, considering that NIS, along with EPS (Electric Power Industry of Serbia), is Serbia’s most critical energy company, accounting for 12% of the national budget and 5–6% of the country’s GDP.

The strategic dialogue and nuclear energy

Further complicating matters, the “strategic dialogue” kicked off on the very day the U.S. imposed sanctions on NIS, during a meeting between Vučić and Richard Verma, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources, in Belgrade. Under the September agreement, Serbia also committed to promoting “private sector investments from the U.S. in commercial energy projects, with an emphasis on clean energy projects in Serbia.”

Interestingly, Đurić signed the cooperation agreement, whose first article pertains to nuclear energy, on September 18—just 70 days before Serbia lifted its moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants. On November 28, the Serbian National Assembly passed amendments to the Energy Law, quietly enabling the implementation of provisions emphasizing that “any potential nuclear energy projects must advance the shared goals of both sides.” However, the precise nature of these shared goals remains undefined. It is clear, though, that the U.S. is not aiming for Serbia to acquire modular nuclear reactors from Russia, which Vučić has repeatedly described as the “only” solution to the country’s projected increase in electricity demand.

The agreement also outlines a shared objective to “accelerate the gradual phase-out of coal-fired electricity production,” to ensure that Serbia offers “secure, reliable, and diversified energy sources,” and to complement these efforts with activities that “raise public awareness about clean energy projects in Serbia that may interest U.S. companies.”

Additionally, Serbia has agreed to notify the U.S. before selecting contractors for energy projects, allowing American companies to compete for implementation. The Serbian government also acknowledged in its explanatory memorandum that one goal of the agreement is to “facilitate potential investments by U.S. companies and other forms of energy cooperation.”

The Brussels Declaration

Three months later, on December 18, during the EU-Western Balkans Leaders’ Summit in Brussels, which Vučić attended, a declaration was adopted affirming the “unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective for the Western Balkans” and emphasizing that the region’s future lies in the EU. Beyond the usual rhetoric about the importance of enlargement, the declaration stressed that the strategic partnership between the EU and the Western Balkans is “more crucial than ever” and called on non-aligned countries (i.e., Serbia) to fully harmonize their foreign and security policies with the EU, including imposing sanctions on Russia.

From this vantage point, particularly after the sanctions on NIS, it becomes evident that the part of the declaration addressing energy carries a specific weight, stating that “partners from the Western Balkans should utilise the EU mechanism for the joint purchase of gas and liquefied natural gas in order to reduce their dependence on Russian gas.”

Individually, the Washington Agreement and the Brussels Declaration resemble the typical documents adopted on the sidelines of international meetings. Taken together, however, they point to the conclusion that Serbia, at least in the energy sector, has decided to gradually turn away from the East and move towards the West. For this reason, it seems the authorities in Belgrade would have preferred a little more time before signalling left and turning right.

What consequences this will have for Serbia’s energy sector, which is highly dependent on Russian gas, remains to be seen. The EU’s existing sanctions on Gazprom Neft—but not Gazprom, from whom the EU still procures gas—already forced NIS to replace Russian oil with supplies from other sources more than two years ago. That transition was relatively painless, apart from the fact that NIS is unlikely to ever again achieve profits of nearly €800 million, as it did in 2022, the last year it was able to import and refine Russian crude oil at the Pančevo refinery.

How much has Serbia paid for the Memorandum of Cooperation with the U.S. in infrastructure?

Attention is also drawn to the fact that the strategic energy cooperation agreement with the U.S. was preceded by a Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation in Infrastructure, signed in Belgrade on 6 September 2018. This very document served as the basis for a €900 million contract signed in early December 2019 by then-Minister of Infrastructure Zorana Mihajlović, in the presence of Vučić at the Presidency building, with the U.S. company Bechtel and Turkey’s ENKA—without a tender—for the construction of the Morava Corridor. Under the contract, the first “digital motorway” was supposed to be completed by the end of 2023. However, on 22 December last year, Vučić announced that all works would be completed only in mid-2026, a year and a half later.

Despite the fact that Bechtel and ENKA will complete the project two and a half years after the agreed deadline, they had already received €1.54 billion from the state budget for this motorway by 31 December 2024. Well-informed sources from Radar estimate that the final cost will be between €2.2 billion and €2.5 billion—two and a half times the initially agreed amount.

This, however, did not deter the government from contracting another project with the Bechtel-ENKA consortium. While opening the Morava Corridor section between Kruševac and Vrnjačka Banja on 22 December 2024, Vučić announced that a new Memorandum of Understanding had been signed with the same contractors. As soon as the ongoing work is completed, they will be engaged to construct a high-speed road from Kraljevo, via Raška, to Novi Pazar and from Raška to Jarinje.

Insiders claim this was entirely expected, pointing to Vučić’s literal statement from December 2019: “I hope that when you complete this project, you will have another major job waiting for you. We have some ideas, but we’ll talk about those another day.”

That day evidently arrived five years later, regardless of Bechtel failing to meet the terms of the initial contract. Taxpayers will bear the burden of €1.5 billion more than originally planned. However, this may pale in comparison to the potential costs of the country’s energy realignment, given that the current government has done little over the past 12 and a half years to ensure energy supply from diversified sources. Serbia still remains entirely dependent on Russian gas imports. For this reason, the authorities persistently rule out the possibility of a “hostile takeover” of Russia’s stake in NIS. Should they proceed with such a move, the gas supply would likely be halted immediately, making the cost far greater than the benefit.

(Radar, 28.01.2025)

https://radar.nova.rs/ekonomija/energetika-srbija-nis-eps-rusija-sad-sankcije/

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