On the penultimate day of March, Croatian President Zoran Milanović noted that “the political statements and actions of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić” in recent days and weeks are “contrary to the objectives of the Brdo–Brijuni Process,” since dialogue among Balkan states is impossible if one side “endangers interstate relations, peace, and stability in Southeast Europe.” Accordingly, he said, the invitation for the Serbian president to attend the May meeting no longer stands.
The list of Vučić’s contentious statements is rather long. For instance, speaking on RTS, he said that “there is nothing Croatia has not done to undermine Serbia,” levelled accusations at so-called “blockade cooks,” as well as at Tonino Picula, the European Parliament’s envoy for Serbia, and stirred fears of potential armed conflict in the Balkan Peninsula – only to subsequently calm them down.
He also often claims that Priština, Tirana, and Zagreb have joined forces against Serbia through a military-technical agreement, while omitting that Serbia and Croatia signed a similar agreement in 2010 which remains in force.
While some interpretations suggest that the Serbian president is resorting to anything that might mobilise his not particularly enthusiastic supporters ahead of still-unannounced parliamentary elections, parts of the Croatian public see Milanović’s decision as pandering to an increasingly right-leaning electorate. Political consultant Aleksandar Musić told *Radar* that in Croatia, an EU and NATO member, developments in Serbia are in fact followed rarely and superficially, including student-civic protests and frequent mentions of Croatia in a negative context. Nevertheless…
“Milanović, as a politician, is characterised by managerial ineffectiveness and rhetorical skill. He has good political instinct, which brought him back into political life in 2020. Thus, during his first term, by appealing to the masses, he critically addressed the issue of COVID; now he criticises Israel and reacts more sharply to Vučić. Clearly, he saw an opportunity, made a move, gained some points and – interestingly – quickly closed the issue. I assume he collected some sympathy without wanting to create a prolonged saga,” our interlocutor says.
On the other hand, he adds, the Croatian government largely ignores Vučić – partly because outside its core interests it focuses only on the EU and Croats in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and partly because it understands that harsher tones provide the Serbian president with an abundance of “desperately needed anti-Croatian fuel for an already prepared fire.”
Two entities, many problems
Coincidentally or not, three days after Milanović’s decision – which was somewhat softened by Slovenian President Nataša Pirc Musar, co-chair of the process, who offered alternative meeting locations – Vučić met with Milorad Dodik. Although the Constitutional Court in Sarajevo had banned him from political activity for six years and imposed a one-year prison sentence for failing to respect decisions of High Representative Christian Schmidt, given the resulting political crisis in Republika Srpska, there is hardly a more relevant interlocutor than the former entity president and Serb member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency – especially considering the stated topic of the meeting: “important issues facing Serbs in the region.”
Vučić had previously described the ruling against Dodik as unacceptable and “directed against the entire Serbian people.” Many in Sarajevo interpreted this as interference in the internal affairs of a neighbouring country, particularly Denis Bećirović, the Bosniak member of the Presidency.
Six months later, the two leaders did not discuss the many signed and forgotten declarations on national endangerment, but they did address the military agreement between Priština, Tirana, and Zagreb, as well as “the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” according to a post on Vučić’s Instagram account – though not on Dodik’s.
Throughout the previous year, when students and citizens shattered the persistent myth of irreconcilability between Sandžak and the rest of Serbia, Usame Zukorlić – leader of the Justice and Reconciliation Party and Minister for Reconciliation, Regional Cooperation, and Social Stability – acted on behalf of official Belgrade. During a visit to Sarajevo, he spoke of the need to improve relations between Belgrade and Bosnia’s capital, repeating the claim at the first consultations between the Serbian president and representatives of parliamentary parties on calling snap elections.
On the other hand, it seems that the Serbian president often equates cooperation with the Federation with reiterating that the Dayton Agreement is beyond question. Anything more than that appears unnecessary.
For example, in September 2025, in a speech before the United Nations, he stated that “lies and accusations” were coming from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and being used for a “reckoning with legitimate representatives of the Serbian people.” It is unclear whether he was referring to Dodik or to himself, given that he spent much of the previous year denying obscure accusations that he had served as a “liaison” for a macabre safari in besieged Sarajevo – something he arguably would not have had to do had he not spent time in Pale as an operative of Vojislav Šešelj.
In January 2026, speaking from Trebinje, he said Serbia would continue to support projects in Republika Srpska, and that it had also wanted to assist the Federation, which had declined the offered hand. People wonder why…
The case of Montenegro
Perhaps the most complex relations are those between Serbia and Montenegro. In October last year, certain Montenegrin politicians accused Vučić of stoking anti-Turkish protests as a way of confronting official Ankara over drone sales to Kosovo. This seems unfounded, yet it was enough to trigger a subsequent exchange of harsh words. Two months later, responding to a journalist from TV Prva about the opening of Cluster 3, Vučić managed not to say much new, but did respond to official Podgorica, stating that he “would not pretend to be Montenegro and curry favour with Croatia.”
Unlike Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegrin political life includes figures who boast of close ties with the Serbian president and who, when needed, place themselves at the service of his political machinery, appearing at events organised by his party. This was once Andrija Mandić, leader of New Serb Democracy and current Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament.
Now the banner of the Serbian Progressive Party in Montenegro is carried by his former coalition partner Milan Knežević, president of the Democratic People’s Party and a member of parliament. However, Daliborka Uljarević of the Centre for Civic Education told Radar that few in the neighbouring country fail to see both men as extensions of official Belgrade.
According to her, their actions – within the context of the state of democracy in Serbia – cannot have a positive effect on the democratisation and Europeanisation of Montenegro, a Western Balkan country whose EU membership is tentatively projected for 2028. The negative impact is reflected in internal identity issues as well as in the country’s foreign policy orientation. She adds that influence is also exerted through the increasingly radical Serbian Orthodox Church, as well as through media and associated institutional structures.
“There is no doubt that every step Montenegro takes towards the EU is perceived in official Serbia as an unbearable political challenge, and often as a direct blow to its own influence in the region. The problem is that this does not remain confined to rhetoric, which itself goes without an adequate and articulated response from the authorities in Montenegro. An illustrative example is the attempt to ‘regionalise’ the local issue of constructing a wastewater treatment facility in Botun, which official Belgrade elevates to a broader political topic simply because it is a project important for Montenegro’s obligations in the EU integration process, particularly in environmental protection,” Uljarević explains, noting that one should not overlook a series of issues which – under perceived pressure from Serbia – have contributed to the deterioration of Montenegro’s relations with Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.
Yet, in December, the Centre for Civic Education conducted a survey with the DAMAR Institute showing that 54.4% of Montenegrin citizens see Vučić as a problem for Serbia and the region, while only 15.4% perceive him as a great statesman. This percentage is lower than the combined support for parties promoting his policies in Montenegro. Additionally, fewer than one-third of citizens of Serbian nationality in Montenegro hold a positive view of Vučić, while 30.12% of respondents said they had no clear stance – most often indicating pronounced ambivalence.
(Radar, 14.04.2026)
https://radar.nova.rs/politika/srbija-i-zapadni-balkan-spoljna-108/