Aleksandar Vučić knows that whichever candidate he puts forward for president will not be strong enough to defeat the one proposed by the students and embraced by the rebellious segment of society.
Therefore, Serbia’s president will most likely indeed resign from that office in two or three months, as he has announced, call elections, lose them peacefully, but then move into the position of prime minister, reconstruct the Serbian government, and serve out the entire term until the beginning of 2028 and the conclusion of Expo.
This is how certain sources and well-informed observers of political developments assess what lies ahead on Serbia’s political scene. Some of our interviewees also believe that Vučić cannot find a way out under any scenario and cannot remain in power, but they all agree that he will not dare to call parliamentary elections before the legally prescribed deadline.
“The candidate of the civic bloc would probably defeat Vučić’s candidate”
“There are two kinds of rulers. The first exercise power on behalf of the citizens who elected them and for the benefit of the society from which they come. They are prepared to sacrifice their profession, their family, and even their lives for what they promised their voters. What matters to them is not the length of their term, their popularity, or the benefits that power brings, but rather fulfilling the task entrusted to them from the position to which they were elected,” lawyer Siniša Nikolić, former chief of staff to the assassinated Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić.
“The second type are those who hold power for their own benefit and that of their close circle; those who are elected on the basis of false promises, exploiting the emotions of the most vulnerable groups in society, and who, once in power, satisfy them by opening casinos, stadiums, and reality television programmes,” he added.
“These latter figures are more dangerous to society than a foreign occupier because they gradually take control of all three branches of government and impose a media blackout. Unfortunately, our current long-serving ruler belongs to this second category,” Nikolić believes.
Analysing the next moves that Serbia’s president could make from Vučić’s perspective, Nikolić says it is realistic to expect the following:
“The president resigns at a large, carefully staged rally on Vidovdan. The Speaker of Parliament becomes Acting President of the Republic. The Prime Minister resigns, and Ana Brnabić proposes the former President of Serbia as the nominee for a new government. Parliament elects a new government headed by the old-new prime minister, Aleksandar Vučić. With a new cabinet, Vučić tours the country, prepares his campaign, and announces large increases in pensions, wages, and investment. He will liberate Kosovo, unite Serbia with Republika Srpska, bring flying cars from China, and at the same time lead Serbia into the European Union,” Nikolić explains.
He goes on to say that Ana Brnabić, as Acting President of Serbia, would call presidential elections for 27 September 2026. The candidate of the civic bloc would probably defeat Vučić’s candidate, but Vučić would marginalise the new president through his government and media apparatus, much as Slobodan Milošević once marginalised Milan Milutinović.
“Prisoners of their own past behaviour”
According to Dejan Bursać, a researcher at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has no electoral strategy that works in its favour.
“First, the presidential elections are due. They must be held by the end of May next year, and that is a major problem because they have no candidate. In the eighteen years of the party’s existence, they have failed to create a second political figure besides Aleksandar Vučić. Now they face a serious problem because Vučić cannot run for president again, which means they will inevitably put forward a weaker candidate who is highly likely to lose to almost anyone, given the accumulated social dissatisfaction,” Bursać says.
“On the other hand,” he adds, “if the SNS could win parliamentary elections, history tells us they would already have called them, because they have done so four times before on an early basis.”
“In other words, they have called snap parliamentary elections four times over the past twelve years. Yet for more than a year now, they have avoided calling early elections, and everyone understands why: they still do not have – and perhaps never again will have – the numbers needed to win. It seems to me that the SNS is waiting; they are trying various things, but essentially they are waiting for a favourable situation that may never arise again. In that sense, they are prisoners of their own past behaviour. Whenever they faced a protest movement – whether over (the massacre in the Vladislav) Ribnikar school, Rio Tinto, or something else – they would wait three or six months for the protests to die down, then call elections, deploy their electoral machinery, win those elections, and thereby neutralise the social discontent,” the Danas interviewee explains.
(Danas, 15.06.2026)
https://www.danas.rs/vesti/politika/opstanak-vucica-na-vlasti/