It used to be the dividing line that sorted political parties in Serbia into two irreconcilable, distant camps. For or against Serbia’s accession to the European Union (EU) has divided parties and voters alike for decades. Yet, after 14 years of rule by the Serbian Progressive Party, the topic has almost vanished from electoral manifestos, and Serbia’s path towards the EU has stalled for several years.
Although the authorities promised that Serbia would meet all criteria for EU membership by the end of 2026, little has been done to change anything in practice, and support for accession diminishes every year.
“These elections are no different from previous ones, where the EU is hardly a topic at all – neither for the government, nor for the opposition, and now not even for students. It’s not a topic for citizens either, which is very unusual for a country that is still officially a candidate for EU membership, given that in other cases there has been much greater pressure and demand from civil society, the media, and citizens to discuss this issue,” says Nataša Stičinska from the Institute of European Studies at Jagiellonian University in Kraków, speaking to BBC News in Serbian.
In the elections on 25 October, a list called European Serbia will also be competing, with Dragan Đilas’s Party of Freedom and Justice (SSP) forming its backbone.
The remaining lists do not address European themes in their titles, and mostly not in their programmes or public appearances either.
Why has the EU topic left the table?
Corruption, betrayal, blockades, and even rape instead of clusters, chapters, and high representatives have become the buzzwords of the heated election campaign ahead of the election of 250 MPs to the National Assembly of Serbia.
“The political scene has changed significantly since the canopy collapse in Novi Sad, and that has directed much more attention towards the principles of governance in Serbia and high-level corruption. On the other hand, the European Union has not been entirely consistent in its policy towards Serbia: some things have changed a little, but different actors in Brussels still hold varying stances,” believes Frauke Seebass, a researcher at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.
The fact that Marta Kos, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, decided in early September not to visit Serbia because of the manner in which convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić was buried failed to spark major interest among key election contenders.
There was an equally absent reaction when Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, decided to bypass Belgrade and Sarajevo during her Western Balkans tour this autumn, just as numerous decisions regarding the future of EU enlargement are expected from Brussels.
“The whole accession process has been dragging on for a very long time, and citizens have undoubtedly grown weary of talk about the European Union – something that is also happening in other Western Balkan countries, and did in Turkey a decade ago,” says Marko Todorović, a senior researcher at the European Policy Centre, speaking to BBC News in Serbian.
‘The authorities have worked for years to prevent dialogue on the EU’
Although the Progressives came to power in Serbia in 2012 with the idea of accelerating the country’s entry into the EU, things have gone in the opposite direction over the past fourteen years.
From a country once tipped to reach the doorstep of membership ahead of its neighbours, Serbia has slipped far behind Montenegro and Albania, struggling for years even to open negotiating chapters.
Belgrade also distanced itself from Brussels through decisions not to join sanctions against Russia after Moscow invaded Ukraine in 2022.
“European integration is a controversial topic, and the absence of discussion about it is something the authorities have carefully worked on for years.
“The ruling establishment behaves like pro-European politicians outside Serbia, while on the domestic front they are dedicated to preserving nationalist votes, so the exit from these two conflicting positions is simply not to discuss the matter at all,” concludes Nataša Stičinska.
From the perspective of Brussels, which is vying for influence in Serbia with Washington, Moscow, Beijing, and even Ankara, even such a controversial stance has often been enough for a passing grade.
“The authorities in Belgrade do not necessarily see the EU as anti-European because they are implementing certain reforms, albeit with slowdowns such as the Mrdić (judicial) laws, and that is enough to convince certain member states that Serbia is on the European path.
“There is also the belief that it is necessary to cooperate with whoever is in power in Belgrade, because Serbia is seen as the largest country in the Western Balkans and crucial for the stability of the entire region,” says Marko Todorović.
According to Frauke Seebass, Serbia’s rulers have managed to extract multiple benefits precisely from this policy of playing all sides in international relations.
“Strong anti-European and anti-Western rhetoric has ultimately, perhaps contrary to expectations, brought Serbia a stronger position in its relations with the EU than neighbouring countries enjoy,” she says.
Students as an enigma for Europe
An equally striking absence of European themes characterises the campaign of the Student List.
Its representatives openly state that this can only be discussed once the “state is sorted out” and numerous internal conflicts and issues are resolved.
In their approach, Nataša Stičinska – who spent the previous year in Belgrade researching the European perspective and the student movement – sees a clear strategy designed to fit “as many people as possible under a big tent.”
“They are neglecting progressive voters and trying to get as close as possible to voters who are more nationalist and Eurosceptic. Such a strategy is short-term and might work for the elections, though I’m not entirely convinced of even that, because there is a possibility that clearly pro-European voters will look for an alternative to the student list,” she says.
Despite cycling tours to Strasbourg and occasional meetings with European officials, the student movement and its representatives have not established significant contacts with potential partners in Brussels.
“For Brussels, the other side is quite an unknown; it was hard to conclude who to talk to because the pro-European opposition parties are very active, but not very strong. Under these circumstances, Vučić presents himself as a safer solution, even though it is clear that Brussels does not support all of his policies,” notes Stičinska.
(Danas, BBC Serbia, 30.09.2026)