From 2000 to 2022, Serbia received 7.7 billion dollars from China, most of it in the form of loans, according to data from the international organisation AidData.
AidData, a research laboratory that tracks how governments spend money beyond their own borders, published a comprehensive report this October on Chinese investments around the world.
When it comes to Chinese money in Serbia, analysed in a dedicated report, the key feature is that the largest share consists of loans for infrastructure projects, mining and energy, many of which are granted on the condition that Chinese companies provide goods or services for the projects.
Loans worth dizzying millions have also raised the question of whether Serbia will be able to repay its debts.
“Serbia is not over-indebted to China in terms of the overall level of debt, but the debt growth rate and the issue of its concentration among creditors can be a warning sign,” says economist Nikola Stakić, a professor at Singidunum University, for the BBC in Serbian.
The largest single creditor is the Chinese state-owned Export-Import Bank of China, to which Serbia, according to the latest data from September 2025, owes 2.8 billion dollars-45 million more than a year earlier.
Globally, China has lent more than two trillion dollars worldwide from 2000 to 2023, which is twice as high as previous estimates, according to the AidData report.
Money has flowed to both poor and rich countries, and 200 billion dollars from Chinese state lenders has reached the United States.
A large share of the loans extended to wealthy countries has been directed towards critical minerals and high-tech industries, which has fuelled fears in the West of Chinese domination in key sectors and prompted some governments to tighten regulations to prevent the influx of Chinese money.
“For many years, we assumed that virtually all Chinese money was going to developing countries,” says Brad Parks, executive director of AidData, for the BBC.
“And so it came as a big surprise to realise that actually hundreds of billions of dollars are going to countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany – and that it is all happening right under our noses.”
In a statement for the BBC in Serbian, Brad Parks explains that Chinese loans to developing countries, a group to which Serbia also belongs, are largely directed towards infrastructure projects and are included in countries’ public debt. “Chinese state banks are the main financiers of public infrastructure in transport, energy and industrial development in low- and middle-income countries. In contrast, Chinese lending to high-income countries is less focused on public infrastructure. In the wealthier EU member states, Chinese state creditors provide corporate loans, commercial banking finance, credit lines for Chinese subsidiaries in Europe, and lending that facilitates Chinese outbound investment,” he says.
Another difference is that investments undergo weaker oversight in Serbia than in EU member states. “This may help explain why Serbia has become one of China’s most important economic partners in the Western Balkans.” “In Serbia, there are no such restrictions, and therefore it is crucial for Chinese companies that wish to operate close to, but not within, the EU’s regulatory space,” says Parks.
Specific features of Chinese loans
Beijing treats the details of its overseas investments – how much money it spends and where – as a state secret. In Serbia, loan agreements go through parliament and are publicly available.
However, AidData’s analysis also reveals the money that the Chinese state has channelled towards companies operating in Serbia, such as Zijin, the majority owner of the Bor Mining and Smelting Basin. It was more difficult for us to obtain data and documentation on Chinese grants and loans provided to Serbian state institutions, Brad Parks tells the BBC in Serbian. “Over time, Beijing’s activities related to extending loans and grants abroad have become increasingly non-transparent,” Parks explains. This is evident, he continues, in the latest report on Chinese money around the world.
Regarding loans, the analysis states that Serbia’s borrowing terms were more favourable than those offered by Chinese lenders to other countries with similar income levels.
“The financial terms of credit arrangements with Chinese creditors should be viewed as part of a broader mosaic, taking into account the overall strategic relations between the two countries, the structure of the projects and Chinese investments, as well as the political framework of mutual respect and friendship,” says Nikola Stakić and adds:”On the other hand, more favourable borrowing terms do not mean that the entire economic arrangement is more advantageous, because other factors must also be considered.” He cites, as an example, the level of mining royalties, which he describes as “rather low”.
Mining royalty is the money companies pay to the state for exploiting its mineral resources.
In previous years, mining experts have highlighted the low level of mining royalties in Serbia, while the Minister of Energy, Dubravka Đedović Handanović, has said it is among the higher ones in the world, according to Danas.
Besides lower interest rates, there are other specific features of Chinese loans compared with those arriving from Europe. Loans from China are more flexible and more readily available to Serbia, and the country does not have to go through complicated procedures, project documentation and everything else required by European banks, Stakić says. But the drawback is the lack of adequate transparency, he points out.
How did the Chinese money arrive?
Since 2010, the inflow of Chinese funds into Serbia has been growing.
The peak came in 2019, when Serbia received 1.6 billion dollars, of which 1.1 billion were loans for the modernisation of the railway line from Novi Sad to the Hungarian border.
As part of this project, the reconstruction of the Novi Sad Railway Station was carried out. In 2024, its canopy collapsed, killing 16 people, which triggered a wave of anti-government protests.
The main contractors for these works were a consortium of Chinese companies, China Railway International (CRIC) and China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), while the subcontractors were both Chinese and domestic.
Companies involved in this project obtained and performed work by bypassing domestic regulations, based on informal, friendly arrangements – a foundation for corruption, according to one of the conclusions of the informal Inquiry Commission that analysed the reconstruction of the Novi Sad Railway Station.
However, the “friendly ties” between China and Serbia had been confirmed much earlier through official documents.
In 2009, Serbia signed an Intergovernmental Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Infrastructure with China, which would later become the basis for contracts for work on major projects. This agreement was concluded during the rule of the coalition around the Democratic Party (now in opposition), but was later supplemented with annexes under the Progressive Party’s government. For example, the second annex, adopted in 2013, stipulates that programmes and projects “shall not be subject to the obligation of public tendering for investment works and the delivery of goods and services, unless otherwise specified in the commercial contract”.
This means that companies carrying out the works may be selected directly, which is generally not the case for domestic projects. The beginning of multi-million Chinese loans for infrastructure projects was the construction of the bridge connecting two Belgrade districts, Zemun and Borča, known as the Pupin Bridge (named after the renowned Serbian scientist Mihajlo Pupin). It was formally opened in December 2014 by the then Chinese and Serbian prime ministers, Li Keqiang and Aleksandar Vučić. The Pupin Bridge was described at the time as the first major Chinese infrastructure project in Europe.
Besides the Pupin Bridge and railway modernisation, Chinese loans were also used for the construction of motorways such as Miloš Veliki, as well as for the Kostolac B Thermal Power Plant.
Chinese state funds also reached the companies Zijin Copper and Zijin Mining, both owned by Zijin. A controlling stake in RTB Bor was purchased, followed by investments in technological improvements to the mine. A total of around 525 million dollars in loans was provided, which AidData labels as “potential public debt”. This means that although the state of Serbia is not the loan recipient, nor is there evidence that it provided state guarantees for these loans, there remains a possibility that it might take part in the repayment, explains Brad Parks. The mining complex in Bor, where gold and copper are primarily extracted, contributes three percent to Serbia’s overall gross domestic product. If the joint venture managing the mine were unable to repay the Chinese debt, the Serbian Government could help with repayment because the company is important to the national economy, Parks explains.
How much money has China given to Serbia?
When everything is added up, up to and including 2022, China was Serbia’s second-largest development partner. Ahead of it is the European Union, with 10.3 billion euros. However, while most of the EU’s ten billion euros consist of non-repayable funds, out of China’s 7.7 billion, the total amount of non-repayable aid is 304 million euros. AidData notes, however, that donations in goods are not easy to convert into monetary value, which is why their financial worth is “likely underestimated”.
Among the donors, Zijin stands out, having invested in education, healthcare, sports, as well as 730,000 dollars from the Chinese state for the University of Novi Sad, where the Confucius Institute is located. Most of the loans, a total of 4.5 billion, are currently being repaid, while the value of nine loans amounting to 250 million should already have been repaid, according to AidData. The value of the loans being repaid may be even higher, since AidData did not find data for some of them, the report states. “What accompanies the international policy of Chinese lenders in developing countries (particularly African and Asian countries) is a high level of so-called ‘hidden debt’, meaning various arrangements that do not appear in official statistics. If even part of this is present in Serbia, it would mean that the official public debt does not fully reflect the real situation,” says Nikola Stakić.
Brad Parks, however, says that according to their data, “Serbia’s exposure to hidden sources of public debt is relatively small compared to other participant states in the Belt and Road Initiative.”
(BBC Serbia, 25.11.2025)
https://www.bbc.com/serbian/articles/c78356w6895o/lat