The European Union is introducing a new package of measures providing for stricter migration controls, faster deportations of rejected asylum seekers, and a political opening towards the establishment of so-called return centres in third countries.
While the European Commission argues that the goal is greater control over migration flows, critics warn that responsibility is being shifted beyond the borders of the Union.
Radoš Đurović, Executive Director of the Centre for the Protection and Assistance of Asylum Seekers, gives his views about what these changes entail, their consequences for transit countries, and where Serbia fits into the picture
Inefficiency of the existing system and the securitisation of migration
According to Đurović, the new measures represent a continuation of the increasingly restrictive migration policies that have been developing over the past several years. Brussels’ primary objective is to accelerate readmission procedures, given that the current system has achieved extremely low implementation rates.
“Let me remind you that readmission, or the removal and deportation of people from the European Union, has so far failed to produce significant results. Only around 20 per cent of those who were supposed to be returned to the countries they came from were actually returned,” Đurović emphasises.
He adds that European migration management policy has effectively failed the test of returning those without legal grounds to remain, resulting in widespread inefficiency.
The focus of the new approach is on individuals who have committed criminal offences or are considered a threat to national security and the communities in which they live. However, the procedures also affect family members and children, which has sparked intense debate regarding the right to family life, the prohibition of torture, and the ban on collective expulsions.
Đurović believes that current policies are primarily centred on the “securitisation” of migration – that is, viewing migration exclusively through the lens of security. This approach calls into question a number of international legal instruments, including the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the conventions of the Council of Europe.
Externalising the problem and pressure on the Western Balkans
The idea of establishing return centres in third countries, according to Đurović, is an attempt to externalise the migration challenge, whereby destination countries seek to reduce migratory pressure on themselves and redistribute it to transit territories.
Although the primary plan is to locate these camps around the Mediterranean basin – in Africa and Asia – the Balkans cannot be ignored. Existing examples, such as the agreement between Italy and Albania, demonstrate that such centres may also be established within the region.
“We have the territory of Kosovo in the Balkans, which has concluded a similar agreement with the United States. We also have North Macedonia, which has held discussions with the United Kingdom. We do not yet know the outcome regarding these return camps. There is also public discussion suggesting that Montenegro could become a host country for one of these centres, but neither Serbia nor Bosnia and Herzegovina can be ruled out,” Đurović explains, noting that many countries are currently assessing the potential benefits and drawbacks.
Serbia’s position: Between the European wall and porous borders
Serbia finds itself in a unique and uncertain position. On the one hand, migration through the country remains intensive and diverse, ranging from refugees from Ukraine and Russia to people arriving from Asia and Africa, as well as labour migrants.
Đurović underlines that the fact that people seek assistance in Serbia is encouraging, as it demonstrates that the country offers a degree of security amid global instability. At the same time, however, this creates enormous challenges for the system.
Because Serbia is the last stop before the Schengen Area, new EU rules and border procedures could result in large numbers of people being rejected and effectively pushed back across the border into Serbia.
Current field data indicate that migrants remain in Serbia only briefly – typically one or two days – before continuing their journey with the assistance of smugglers. However, from mid-June, when the new measures come into effect, the situation may change.
“With these two changes coming into force in mid-June, it is possible that we could see an accumulation of people here – not in some dramatic scenario, but certainly longer stays and the problems that come with them,” Đurović warns.
He also points to the regional problem of insufficient coordination: “Serbia can hardly rely on cooperation with its neighbours regarding migration and the fate of these people, because tensions persist and there is often a lack of willingness to cooperate in that regard. At the same time, Serbia has a wall behind it and a porous border in front of it. By ‘wall’, I mean, in a sense, the wall of the European Union.”
The EU has assured Serbia that it will not be left to deal with the situation alone and that assistance will be provided, while countries further south will also be expected to shoulder part of the burden in a spirit of solidarity. Nevertheless, Đurović concludes that the true picture of how Serbia will cope with these challenges will become clear only in the coming months.
Smuggling and activity “below the radar”
Commenting on reports about the discovery of illegal migrant camps, such as one believed to be housing Afghan nationals, Đurović explains that migration has largely gone “below the radar” of the domestic system since the end of 2023.
The number of reception centres in Serbia has been reduced from 19 to only four operational centres.
As a result, migrants no longer stay in official facilities. Instead, organised criminal smuggling groups accommodate them on the outskirts of urban areas such as Belgrade, Novi Sad, Subotica and Niš, or along green-border zones.
An additional challenge for institutions is the presence of a large number of legally employed foreign workers who are visually indistinguishable from refugees, making it more difficult to identify and monitor the actual situation on the ground.
Bureaucratic solutions miss the root causes
When asked whether the new agreement offers a long-term solution to migration pressures, Đurović argues that the current direction of European policy is misguided and reflects the perspective of administrators far removed from realities on the ground.
“I believe this is a perspective from behind a desk – an administrative, bureaucratic perspective. All these measures, which are intended to deter people from attempting to come, fail to address the core issue, namely the reasons why these people are coming in the first place,” Đurović stresses.
Pushing people back and erecting barriers does not stop those fleeing war, violence and threats to their lives, because they often have nowhere to return to. Such measures merely increase their suffering and directly benefit smugglers, who profit even more from desperate migrants.
While these measures may make sense in the context of purely economic migration, global instability and the emergence of new conflict zones, such as in Sudan, as well as tensions involving Iran, will continue to force people to flee for safety at all costs.
In the long term, the solution lies in improving minimum living conditions in countries of origin. However, as Đurović concluded, this is currently difficult to achieve due to the withdrawal of the United States from many support programmes in Asia and Africa, and Europe’s inability to bear that burden on its own.
(RTS, 04.06.2026)
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