By Zorica Miladinović
“I want to emigrate to the country from the RTS main news programme,” was a catchphrase during the civil and student protests of the 1990s, serving as a satirical response to the stark gap between harsh reality and the rosy picture painted by state television – which we now call the public broadcaster.
Such a sentiment could, without a doubt, apply just as well in 2026, describing, among other things, the drastically differing views on the actions and outcomes of Aleksandar Vučić’s presidency held by the ruling Progressive regime, its supporters, and strictly controlled outlets, compared to those held by the critical public, a rebellious society, and independent media.
The opinions of the “two Serbias,” which view reality so differently, even differed on whether the President of Serbia would genuinely resign on Sunday evening, September 27, from the office he has held since May 31, 2017, as he had promised, or if it was just another of his manipulations.
“Over the past 11 years, more transport infrastructure has been built than during the combined 70 years of rule under Josip Broz Tito, Slobodan Milošević, and the DOS (The Democratic Opposition of Serbia),” is one of Vučić’s numerous self-praises regarding his “historical results,” particularly in the economy, which he has repeated since 2012 when the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) came to power, and throughout his two presidential terms.
In contrast, the opposition and the student movement tend to argue that he has turned Serbia into an autocracy, deeply divided it, dismantled its institutions, and generated massive crime and corruption – corruption that has “started killing” innocent people, such as those waiting for a train in Novi Sad.
“Historical” economic successes that bother Serbia’s enemies
Vučić and representatives of the current SNS-led government counted among Serbia’s greatest successes between 2017 and 2026 – during his consecutive presidential terms – not only the “historical” economic revival, but also infrastructure development, and the strengthening of the country’s foreign policy and defensive positions, noting that the military has “never received more investment.”
The President was keen to emphasise that Serbia currently holds its largest foreign exchange reserves and gold reserves in history, making the country financially the most stable and “richest in history.”
According to Vučić and his associates, Serbia holds a leading position in Europe in terms of economic growth rate, including the first half of this year, when it stood at 3.5%.
Among the most significant results, they also count the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI), citing data that Serbia continuously attracts over 60% of such investments in the Western Balkans, which has contributed to the opening of “hundreds of new factories and plants across the country.” Vučić announced that between 2017 and today, Serbia has attracted between 30 and 35 billion euros in such investments.
His “historical” achievements also include a drop in unemployment and a rise in living standards. According to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, the unemployment rate in the second quarter of this year stands at 7.2%, compared to 24.6% in 2012 and 13.5% in 2017. During the current campaign, Vučić announced the goal of raising the average salary in Serbia to 1,200 euros by the end of this year, whereas it was around 360 euros in 2012 and just under 440 euros in 2017.
The average pension by mid-2026 stood at 486 euros, and following the announced 7.5% increase taking effect on December 1st of this year, it will reach 522 euros. The average pension in 2012 was 204 euros, and in 2017 – just under 210 euros. He also counts the long-term stability of the dinar as his success.
Both he and his associates are particularly fond of highlighting the record in building motorways and high-speed roads, which, they say, amounts to 686 kilometres between 2012 and this year. Railway modernisation works have been carried out, with a particular achievement being the launch of the Belgrade–Novi Sad high-speed railroad, alongside ongoing construction towards Subotica and Niš.
Since 2017, the new Niš University Clinical Centre has also been completed, and within the UKC Serbia, new towers, the new Dedinje 2 facility, and a new building for the Prokuplje General Hospital have been built. Extensions have been added to the UKC in Novi Sad and Kragujevac.
Vučić and his political allies also point out that they “successfully lead” a balanced policy of military neutrality while maintaining good relations with both the West and the East. According to official statements, the President “held more international visits and talks with world leaders this month than all his predecessors combined since the Second World War.”
Securing the organisation of the specialised exhibition EXPO 2027 in Belgrade is presented as the crown jewel of achievements so far, which, as emphasised, will completely change the face of Serbia and brand it as a regional economic and political leader.
Vučić’s administration even counts “results” regarding the resolution of the Kosovo and Metohija issue among its successes. It views the campaign for the withdrawal of recognition of Kosovo’s independence positively, as well as the diplomatic struggle in the United Nations General Assembly.
Precisely because of this strengthening of Serbia, “those” who want it to weaken supposedly planned, and even attempted, several assassinations against him – some of which “existed” only on the front pages of propaganda outlets before “disappearing” without explanation.
He is the Prime Minister, the Government, and the Parliament, but he is not the President of all citizens of Serbia
Among the opposition, students, and experts in Serbia, however, assessments can be heard that during Vučić’s presidential term, the state has been captured, institutions dismantled, and all political power concentrated in his hands. Consequently, the Prime Minister, the Government, Parliament, local authorities, and even the police and judiciary have become executors of his will.
It has been “noted” in the media that the President drew transport corridors instead of engineers, bought ventilators around the world, and explained to doctors in the field how those devices should be used. It was tragicomic, critics stated, to listen to his “confession” about how he regretted listening to “foreign experts” regarding electricity and power plants, even though he immediately felt they were lying.
He laid foundation stones, cut ribbons, and insisted that those factories were opened by him personally. In front of the cameras, he would phone “those in charge” and arrange for infrastructure and other problems to be solved. In the current campaign across Serbia, he talked to ordinary people and, on the spot, instructed his associates to “write down” the resolution of the people’s troubles in a ledger. He always knew “off the top of his head” what the voter turnout was at Progressive rallies, and particularly at student and civic gatherings.
According to critics of the government, he thus violated the Constitution on a daily basis and quite brutally, as he stepped outside the presidential constitutional framework and usurped the powers of other branches of government. Although the President of Serbia, under the Constitution, holds a ceremonial and representative role, he behaved like the executive branch, and above all like a Prime Minister, making decisions on the economy, finance, foreign policy, energy, urban planning, construction, or municipal utilities.
Although the Constitution strictly prohibits the President of the Republic from holding any other public function or professional activity, as well as a conflict of interest, he – according to the opposition and a section of experts – acted all along as the informal leader of the SNS. In every election, from local to parliamentary, he “lent” his name to his party as the list leader, which directly impacted election results since his personal rating is significantly higher than his party’s. At the same time, he was the main protagonist in the campaign for that list, which was often a functionary-driven campaign.
The highest legislative act of Serbia also dictates that the President “expresses state unity and represents Serbia at home and abroad,” meaning he should legally and formally represent all its citizens, regardless of their political, national, or religious affiliation. He did not do this; rather, he clearly divided citizens into his supporters and opponents – whom he is known to call “terrorists, bandits, criminals, and evil” – and incited them to conflict in his appearances.
The opposition has also warned of situations where the President publicly comments on ongoing investigations, discloses data from court proceedings and security services, and preemptively absolves or declares individuals guilty before official court verdicts. This abuse of constitutional powers and improper influence on the work of prosecutors was also warned against by the Collegium of the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime (TOK).
Monuments of corruption, corruption scandals, and attacks on those who see them
As one of the key problems during Vučić’s presidential term, however, his political opponents point to “rampant” corruption, organised crime, and systemic incompetence.
In their assessment, the greatest monuments of corruption are the completely non-transparent and overpriced Expo, Belgrade Waterfront, or roads and other infrastructure projects across Serbia.
Although difficult to list completely, some of the most significant unsanctioned scandals with an alleged corruptive background include the “long-range sonic weapon,” Banjska, Jovanjica, Savamala, Oskar, Belivuk, the two minutes at the Doljevac toll booth, Krušik, the General Staff, 24 apartments in Bulgaria, the aunt from Canada, Jutka…
They recall that Vučić’s presidential term was also marked by the first mass shootings, in May 2023, which are not directly linked to the government, although assessments exist that they too were a consequence of systemic negligence or inaction. At the Vladislav Ribnikar elementary school in Belgrade, an underage student shot and killed nine of his peers and a security guard. In the villages of Malo Orašje and Dubona near Mladenovac, just a day earlier, a mass shooter – previously known to police and judicial authorities for violent behaviour – killed nine people.
The collapse of the concrete canopy at the reconstructed Novi Sad Railway Station on November 1, 2024, when 16 people died, was also experienced particularly emotionally by the public. Vučić’s critics assess this as a consequence of corruption, as well as the incompetence inevitably brought about by “normalised” party tenders and hiring, along with a lack of accountability for massive violations of the law. This tragedy sparked the largest student and civic protest in the recent history of Serbia, within which the largest protest of that period was organised on March 15, 2025, gathering between 275,000 and 325,000 people according to the Archive of Public Gatherings.
resulDuring this social rebellion, physical clashes occurred, and the police were particularly brutal in Novi Sad, Valjevo, and Belgrade, leaving dozens of injured people in their wake. According to her statement, student Nikolina Sinđelić was taken to the garage of the Serbian Government building following one of the Belgrade protests in August 2025 by the then-commander of the Unit for the Security of Certain Persons and Facilities, Marko Kričak, along with other members of the unit. There, she stated, he slapped her, banged her head against a wall, tore her clothes, smashed her phone, and openly threatened her with rape. Student Luka Mihajlović was severely beaten in late June of last year, underwent surgery, and was then handcuffed to a hospital bed at the Zemun Clinical Hospital Centre (KBC Zemun).
Students and assemblies frequently warned that police at protests did not react to attacks by Progressive activists against them, but instead protected those individuals, resulting in broken jaws and skulls.
Vučić himself praised the professionalism and restraint of the police, emphasising that, as he put it, clashes are most frequently provoked by demonstrators, and that all such protest gatherings are illegal because they were not registered. He called four SNS activists from Novi Sad who broke a student’s jaw early last year “heroes” and pardoned them, halting the criminal proceedings against them.
In an atmosphere of deep intolerance – always generated by the authorities – other critics of Vučić and his political allies were also attacked. Theatre director and Faculty of Dramatic Arts professor Stevan Filipović was beaten while photographing government activists who were “demolishing a protected building” (2026), and Vladimir Arsenijević – a writer, NIN Award winner, and programme director of the Krokodil festival – was physically attacked beneath Branko’s Bridge, where he had come to “prepare and hold a planned commemoration and memorial service for the victims of the Srebrenica genocide, organised by civil society” (2026).
Journalists from media outlets not under the control of Vučić’s administration, or those investigating scandals linked to it, did not fare much better either. In late 2018, the house of Žig Info portal journalist Milan Jovanović was set on fire after a Molotov cocktail was thrown at it. Dragoljub Simonović, a former municipal president of Grocka and an SNS functionary, was legally sentenced as the mastermind behind this attack.
At the entrance to the residential building in Novi Sad where journalist and university professor Dinko Gruhonjić lives, graffiti explicitly calling for his murder was scrawled in 2024, and death threats were sent via social media to the president of the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina (NDNV), Ana Lalić. Following the canopy collapse in their city, a record wave of physical violence against media professionals followed; according to Reporters Without Press and ANEM data, there were at least 89 such incidents between late 2024 and the end of 2025 alone.
Two years ago in central Belgrade, Radar journalist Vuk Cvijić was physically attacked, and this year, the camera crew of N1 Television had their equipment smashed, while Veran Matić – president of ANEM and representative of that association in the Permanent Working Group for the Safety of Journalists – was among those attacked.
“Ćacilend” and loyalists towards a colour revolution
The attacker on the N1 crew, who had previously been sentenced to a multi-year prison sentence for murder, came from Pionirski Park, the so-called “Ćacilend” – a tent settlement set up in March 2025 by the followers of the SNS, which has still not been fully removed. This tent settlement was originally announced as a gathering place for “students who want to study” – in contrast to those blockading faculties – but it turned out that not only state and party functionaries or citizens paid daily wages came there, but also proven criminals.
Vučić himself spoke with appreciation about this unhygienic settlement and its residents, including those in black hoodies and with thick criminal records who were “tasked” with attacking demonstrators and “disciplining” citizens during elections, calling such a space a “symbol of freedom and Serbia’s resistance” and “the freest place in the heart of Europe.”
Previously, he confirmed that a group called the “loyalists” exists within the SNS, which includes his brother, Andrej Vučić, and another family member. He described them as “tougher guys,” leaning towards Russia, who had “sworn on blood” that they would never cooperate with the “yellow scum.” They are ready to “fight” and are “a bit too extreme for his taste.” Within this parallel party or paramilitary structure, as it has been labeled by a section of the public, there are 17,000 people.
According to him, the loyalists are fierce opponents of the “colour revolution,” as he called the anti-government protests and blockades by students and citizens. He stated that there is “endless proof” of a colour revolution, but refused to directly state who stands behind it, or who allegedly paid “more than three billion euros to finance violent protests” aimed, as he said, at overthrowing Serbia’s independent policy so it could no longer protect Kosovo and Metohija and help the Republika Srpska.
“I will defeat them all over the world,” he promised, then later stated that he had “defeated the colour revolution” and promised a book about it, but never published it.
Creeping independence of Kosovo
Precisely Kosovo and Metohija – which he otherwise mentions less and less frequently – is, in the opinion of a section of the opposition, one of the greatest failures of Vučić’s presidential policy, which, through the Second Brussels Agreement (2015) and the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation of Relations (2023), recognised its “creeping independence.”
Both agreements, building on Brussels Agreement 1 (2013), formally and practically enabled the expansion of Pristina’s full sovereignty and administrative control, stripping the Republic of Serbia of its original state functions, the constitutional-legal continuity of its institutions in the north, and the right to block Kosovo’s international integration.
Serbia explicitly committed not to oppose Kosovo’s membership in any international organization, including the UN and the Council of Europe. Pristina’s authorities were granted the right to their own state symbols, and Serbia accepted the obligation to recognize Kosovo passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps. The exchange of permanent missions in government headquarters was agreed upon.
The parallel structures of the Serbian Ministry of Interior (MUP) and Serbian courts in the north were disbanded, and all personnel were integrated into the Kosovo Police and courts, meaning Belgrade lost direct judicial and executive authority. Serbia also lost the right to organize local elections in Kosovo territory under its own laws, which are now conducted exclusively under the laws and with the certification of the Central Election Commission in Pristina.
Kosovo was granted an international dialing code (+383), while the fixed and mobile networks of Serbian-owned enterprises were placed under the regulatory framework of the Kosovo agency (ARKEP). Serbia also lost operational and transmission control over the electricity grid in the north of Kosovo – including key points like Valač and Gazivoda – and the Kosovo transmission system operator (KOSTT) took over full energy independence.
As the sole compensation for losing these competencies, the Republic of Serbia received the right to form the Community of Municipalities with a Serbian Majority (ZSO), which was supposed to secure self-government for Serbs in Kosovo in the areas of economic development, education, healthcare, and urban planning.
The ZSO has not been formed to this day because Pristina refuses to implement such a solution.
How to hide failures?
Among the “selling off” of Serbia – through handing over natural resources to foreign partners – Vučić’s critics also count the Jadar lithium mining project (Rio Tinto), and they also object to dubious foreign investment contracts, such as the Chinese factories Linglong and Zijin, the uncontrolled construction of mini-hydroelectric power plants, and catastrophic air quality in cities.
In Bor, people are already dying en masse from cancer, primarily due to the proximity of the Bor mine, which – after the Chinese company Zijin Mining Group took control of the complex – rapidly expanded production, but without raising environmental standards or implementing more effective measures to protect human health.
To “hide” all these shortcomings, the opposition public assesses, the vast majority of media outlets are strictly controlled and serve to promote the regime and demonize political opponents, and there is an intention to do the same with the only free “islands” – the media of the former United Group.
According to their assessments, Telekom Srbija has become an instrument through which citizens’ money is funneled into the accounts of owners of quasi-media supporting the ruling party, and furthermore, it directly buys and takes over ownership of television channels or founds new ones. It was indirectly involved in the controversial purchase of Prva and B92 televisions by Srđan Milovanović’s Kopernikus.
The most aggressive pro-government propaganda outlet, Informer Television, is expanding its programmes to other television channels, including local ones.
At the same time, these propaganda outlets receive by far the most budget money in media competitions announced at the local, provincial, and national levels, while media striving to be professional are marginalized and even shut down.
When even this kind of propaganda cannot help, Vučić’s critics add, the authorities “play” on irregular electoral conditions, which have existed for years. Voter lists are manipulated, suddenly featuring a significantly larger number of registered voters than adult citizens; phantom voters appear at non-existent residential addresses, such as those with the number zero or at electrical transformer stations; voters are bussed in from Republika Srpska; and systemic pressure is applied to public sector employees and social welfare beneficiaries to collect so-called capillary votes, vote for the regime, photograph their ballots, and participate in “Bulgarian trains” (a vote-rigging method)…
Claims by the authorities in Serbia that they are implementing recommendations regarding elections issued by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), primarily through amending certain legislative solutions, are assessed by both the opposition and civil society as untrue. As they state, reforms are implemented only formally, while conditions on the ground remain unchanged or have worsened.
(Danas, 28.09.2026)