Andrei Kalitin has more than thirty years of a rich career behind him: writing about organised crime, corruption and wars, reporting from Chechnya to Serbia, interviewing Gorbachev, Clinton, Mitterrand and Kissinger, which is simultaneously a chronicle of Russian journalism.
He started his career on Vzglyad, the show that marked the end of the USSR, alongside its best-known TV face Vladislav Listyev, and stayed on after his murder, continuing on the Russian version of the show 60 Minutes – Sovershenno sekretno, before being arrested, detained and facing criminal proceedings in 2024 over articles concerning the FSB’s role in preparing military operations.
“The important thing is not to help her, but not to get in her way,” he summarises in an interview with Radar regarding what Moscow wants from Belgrade.
We conclude our conversation with a “foreign agent” in the eyes of the Russian Ministry of Justice and correspondent for the banned Novaya Gazeta and The Moscow Times just as the polling stations close in Russia:
“Today, the Kremlin is building a single-party system, because only parties that support Putin and his war course are allowed to run in parliamentary elections,” he says, underlining: “All these parties are managed from a single centre, the Presidential Administration. Therefore, that procedure cannot be called a democratic election. It is a political ritual for the legitimisation of war. Figuratively speaking, in Russia today there are two parties: the Party of Death, which has won, and the Party of Life, whose members are either killed, in prison, or exiled from the country and branded as enemies of the people.”
How does official Moscow view Aleksandar Vučić today – as a reliable partner, someone who is balancing, or someone who can no longer be trusted?
Perhaps I should start with how the Kremlin used to view Serbia. The whole world remembers how Yevgeny Primakov turned his plane around above the Atlantic in March 1999 when he learned that NATO had begun the bombing of Yugoslavia. No Russian politician, either before or since, has formulated the Kremlin’s diplomatic reaction so sharply. Somewhat later, in September 1999, Vladimir Putin would tell Bill Clinton: “I think the fate of millions of people is more important than the fate of one man. Besides, our assessments of that man are practically identical. By our estimation, he did not behave as he should have.”
The Kremlin under Vladimir Putin leaves no room for emotion and sentiment. It does only what is useful to the Kremlin and Putin personally. I know that in Moscow, from the very beginning of a war that was supposed to last six to eight weeks, yet dragged on for four and a half years with no end in sight, it was clearly understood how important it was to retain at least some ally in Europe. In practice, “allies” became all those who at least did not publicly condemn Russia and did not join the sanctions. Belarus, which is usually described as Moscow’s closest ally, has still not recognised Crimea as part of Russia – and the Kremlin is quite content with that. They understand it could be worse.
Serbia’s position looks very similar: the Kremlin appreciates the fact that Belgrade has not joined the sanctions, but it also understands that Belgrade is forced to maintain a balance. What Moscow needs above all else right now is Vučić’s political loyalty. Russia believes that economic contracts will eventually help keep Belgrade in Moscow’s orbit, and it is sceptical of Vučić’s prospects for building genuine ties with the EU. He may want that, but he cannot afford to lose Moscow either. That is a cold, cynical calculation, and it shapes the way Moscow assesses Vučić himself: he is viewed simultaneously as a partner and as someone who could turn his back. But Russia cannot afford to politically lose the Balkans. On its western flank, it has almost no allies left anyway.
How much has the export of Serbian ammunition ending up in Ukraine changed that relationship?
I am certain that the Russian intelligence services knew in advance about that decision and the deliveries themselves, and almost certainly have already asked for something in return, as compensation, as a way to strengthen ties. For the Russian services, a modest flow of weaponry helping Ukraine is not particularly troubling. It is much more important for them to retain their training grounds in Serbia and the Balkans in general for training covert military units, as well as to use Belgrade as a base for military-political influence and as a transit zone for transferring agents into Europe. From the Kremlin’s perspective, nothing catastrophic has happened. If nothing else, they have been given an excuse to deepen their behind-the-scenes influence over the Serbian leadership.
With elections on the doorstep in Serbia – how does Russia intervene in electoral processes in countries it considers its sphere of interest?
It is in the Kremlin’s interest that nothing changes in Serbia. The current authorities suit Moscow quite well. Russia knows how to deal with them. Vučić remains a convenient politician as long as he does not introduce sanctions and does not cut off contacts with Moscow and its intelligence services. Russia can influence elections in various ways. Alongside economic pressure, the Kremlin frequently resorts to information warfare. Its main weapon in Serbia is propaganda. Networks like RT, Pravda and Matryoshka have long, skilfully and actively operated in the European information space. But some “hotheads” in the security services could also propose something cruder – for instance, blowing up a facility or committing sabotage on gas infrastructure, while immediately blaming Ukraine for it. I cannot claim that will happen, but almost anything is possible right now.
What tangible and what political interests does Russia see in its relationship with Serbia? What is material, and what is symbolism and influence?
The Kremlin’s material interests are not as large as they appear, but they do exist. First, there is NIS. Until recently, this was the main Russian material asset, control over the only oil refinery in Serbia, via 44.9% of Gazprom Neft’s stake and 11.3% of Gazprom itself. But precisely this asset is now on its way out: following the OFAC sanctions of October 2025 and Vučić’s ultimatums, Moscow is effectively negotiating the sale of its stake in NIS to Hungary’s MOL. Moscow’s interest here is not to “retain the asset”, but to “exit with the minimum possible losses, without losing face”.
The second area of economic interest is gas. Serbia remains a market for Russian gas, and contracts are renewed without any long-term commitment. Russia agrees to these short renewals simply because Gazprom is not in a position to dictate terms today. The new gas pipeline through the Republika Srpska means a great deal to Moscow. One way or another, the Kremlin will continue to seek a corridor for gas exports to the Balkans. But at present, political interests are more important to Moscow than economic ones.
For the Kremlin, it is of crucial importance to have at least one country in Europe that does not publicly join sanctions, keeps diplomatic channels open and does not vote the way the “united West” votes. Russia needs to prove to the entire world that isolation has failed. Serbia serves Moscow as a sort of Balkan shop window for “Slavic brotherhood”. In addition, the Kremlin wants to show other partners in Europe that the “Serbian path” is also available to them – that one can live in Europe and simultaneously remain in the Russian sphere of influence, and even continue receiving gas.
What specifically does Russia expect from Serbia? Votes in international bodies, energy dependence…
The Kremlin is rational – it understands it cannot obtain broad political support from Belgrade. For the Russian security services, Belgrade functions as a headquarters, a hub, a centre of activity. Moscow categorically opposes the introduction of entry visas for its citizens in Serbia largely for this very reason – it needs to be able to send people to Serbia whom EU intelligence services cannot see. Moscow also categorically opposes Serbia’s entry into the EU and NATO.
Following the change of government in Hungary, is Serbia the last outpost of Russian influence in this part of Europe?
No. Moscow will continue to place its political bets on Bulgaria, Moldova, Slovakia and Montenegro as well. Serbia is not the sole island of Russian political influence, but it is the most important one.
What has the Kremlin learned from the loss of Orbán? Is Russia changing its relationship with other European states?
Russia is waging a war against Europe; Ukraine is merely a military testing ground. The loss of allies and friendly political neighbours was inevitable. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and intelligence services understood that, but the country’s course is determined by a single man, and all of them serve him. He, Putin, believes that time is on his side. He is awaiting a “turn to the right” in the politics of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. He believes that he will ultimately succeed in winning and dividing Europe into “spheres of influence”, just as Stalin did in 1945. In that scenario, Serbia, like many other Eastern European countries, would politically become a new, distant province of Russia.
How and to what extent do Russian influence operations target Serbia? What are the indicators?
The moment Belgrade takes a more decisive step towards the EU, Russia will activate its entire arsenal of instruments of influence. Economic pressure will be accompanied by information attacks, acts of sabotage and political provocations, with the aim of bringing forces loyal to the Kremlin to power in the country. Moscow has been selecting candidates for a long time; I am certain the FSB already has a complete list of people it will support when the moment comes. Moscow is currently sincerely irritated by the Carpathian Eight project announced by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, according to whose words “C8” consists of Romania, Serbia, Poland, Slovakia, Czechia, Austria, Hungary and Ukraine. The project is positioned as a joint political alliance at the EU level. The Kremlin will watch very carefully what Belgrade does within it.
How is Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff’s visit interpreted in Moscow – as a sign that Washington is seeking a way out of the war, or as an offer of a settlement that suits Russia?
In Moscow, the Kushner–Witkoff duo is not perceived as a threat. They are viewed as two of Trump’s personal aides, who are essentially playing the role of messengers. The Kremlin will not negotiate peace with them. It can talk with them about the terms of economic cooperation and seek the lifting of sanctions. From the very beginning, the Kremlin has wanted to separate two things: peace in Ukraine and the interests of the Russian national economy. Those two can fly to Moscow for years, and it will have nothing to do with peace negotiations. An end to the war with Ukraine cannot be negotiated without Ukraine itself. Trump needs a major international success because his ratings in America are dropping seriously. But Witkoff and Kushner’s flights to Moscow are the scenery of negotiations, not the negotiations themselves.
How do Russian state media report on these talks? What is put out there, and what is hushed up?
State media in Russia do not have their own opinion. They report according to instructions from the Presidential Administration. Depending on the political temperature in the Kremlin, the image of America changes: first Washington was an enemy, then it became a friend, and now it could become an enemy again. The negotiators’ visits are presented to the public as humble pleas from Washington, pleas for concessions from Russia, for its terms to be accepted, for a favour to be done to it. In the Russian press, the United States appears as a respected but beseeching party, and Putin as the arbiter of world destiny.
What would be an acceptable end to the war for the Kremlin, and what would be interpreted as defeat?
Putin wants to rewrite the rules of international security by dividing Europe into spheres of influence, keeping Eastern Europe and the Balkans for himself. Ukraine is the front line of the war against all of Europe. Victory, as the Kremlin understands it, means: the withdrawal of NATO troops from territories closest to Russia, the resignation or death of Zelenskyy, Europe’s legal recognition that Russia has the right to conquered territories and an agreement on the division of spheres of influence. Anything less than that is defeat.
How does the war in Ukraine actually affect the economy and everyday life in Russia? Is the societal attitude changing? Is there fatigue, or has propaganda succeeded in normalising it?
Today, it is very difficult to measure the actual mood of Russian society. Public opinion polls conducted under censorship and total control, among people living in an atmosphere of fear, cannot answer the question of what society really thinks. But general war fatigue is obvious to everyone. This is a war that the Kremlin does not want, and can no longer, stop without some kind of political victory. Russia has money for the war. It has less and less for the civilian economy and the social sector. But as long as society tolerates this, Putin will continue to wage war.
In September, you were fined 30,000 roubles under Article 13.15 of the Code of Administrative Offences – abuse of media freedom – after Roskomnadzor reviewed your Telegram channel and found content in a post about killed and captured Russian soldiers that, in their assessment, portrays contract military service in a negative light. What is being hidden from the Russian public in war reporting?
Practically everything is withheld from the Russian public: figures on the dead, wounded, captured, economic indicators, official statistics, the budget, the birth rate, the mortality rate. Formally, censorship is still prohibited by Article 29 of the Constitution, but the authorities violate all the laws in the country, and have been doing so for a long time. The Kremlin is more afraid of independent media and journalists of its own country than of NATO soldiers. That is why most of my colleagues can only do their journalistic work from abroad, practically in exile.
You survived an assassination attempt in Moscow in 2007. The Russian Ministry of Justice designated you as a “foreign agent” in September 2025. What is the price of reporting on Russia outside the official dictate?
We fought for our freedom and defended the right to speak the truth. But we lost our home, many friends, all our money and property and, above all, the possibility of return. But that problem is temporary. We will return.
Does the public in Serbia have a realistic picture of what life in Russia is actually like?
I am certain that the majority of people anywhere in the world do not have that picture today. Only those who monitor the situation in Russia and seek independent sources of information about it: regarding repression, torture, arrests, nationalisation and the confiscation of property, can truly see that the country and its citizens are undergoing a catastrophe.
Does Serbia, in your opinion, participate in Russia’s hybrid war against the West?
I have a very large number of good friends in Belgrade and in Serbia generally. I know how many Russian citizens, those fleeing war and repression and protesting against the arbitrariness of the Russian state, have found a new home, a second homeland in Serbia. That memory will live forever in the hearts of Russians, and the love that the Russian people feel for Serbia – a people currently passing through a tragedy – will be eternal. Knowing what so many of my compatriots say about Serbia, how grateful they are to it and how much they love it, I could never say that Serbia is playing on the side of Putin and the Kremlin. Serbia is always on the side of good and on the side of people, and that is what matters most.
(Radar, 29.09.2026)
https://radar.nova.rs/drustvo/andrej-kalitin-beograd-centar-ruskih-sluzbi/