Within the European Union, dissatisfaction is growing over Serbia’s progress on EU integration and the official Belgrade’s handling of the situation within the country. In Brussels, there is increasing talk about the potential withdrawal of support for the regime centred around the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), confidential sources told Radar.
EU member state leaders are still reluctant to openly criticise the behaviour of Serbia’s government, but that does not mean the Western partners’ stance toward it is not changing. The coalition led by the SNS, in reality headed by President Aleksandar Vučić, likely wouldn’t need to worry too much if it hadn’t recently cornered itself into a (geo)political dead end with seemingly no exit strategy.
“For years, it has been said that sitting on multiple chairs won’t be sustainable in the long term, and now that strategy is coming back to bite. Serbia’s leadership has had several unpleasant meetings, with more to come, and one of the messages was that if the situation doesn’t change, the EU will seek alternative partners within the country, which, as the largest economy in the Western Balkans, is expected to lead regional EU integration,” the source said.
Empty promises
The meeting between European Enlargement Commissioner Marija (Marta) Kos and President Vučić only received media attention on 29 March, several days after it took place, when the Slovenian politician stated that the demands of students and protesters aligned with the European Commission’s expectations for Serbia. She also said Vučić had given assurances that members of the REM Council would be elected within three to four weeks, and that reforms of the electoral register and two media laws would follow – which would be just the prerequisites for emerging from the deepest socio-political crisis since the fall of Slobodan Milošević.
To date, these promises have not been fulfilled, nor has any serious work been undertaken to meet them. According to Bojana Selaković, coordinator of the National Convention on the EU, the Commissioner’s statements were more of a test of sincerity than a sign of genuine progress.
“Missing deadlines is not a surprise – it’s a practice. Over the past ten years, we’ve seen that reforms in Serbia are not carried out because they are necessary for citizens, but only when unavoidable to maintain power. The slow reform pace and reluctance to align with European foreign policy are offset by bilateral transactions presented as ‘geopolitical autonomy’ – from lithium deals, to buying one kind of weapon and selling another, to selective energy agreements. These compensations might satisfy certain technical or industrial interests within the EU, but are increasingly met with resistance, both in the European Parliament and among member states that clearly see European silence being used for domestic repression and foreign policy games with authoritarian regimes,” Selaković told Radar.
Ahead of her new visit, expected at the end of April, Kos noted that she is closely monitoring the situation in Serbia, expressing concern over the criminal complaint filed against the Rector of the University of Belgrade, Vladan Đokić. She will surely also comment on the fact that the Serbian president’s assurances ultimately proved to be of little value.
At the end of last month, on 25 March to be precise, Vučić also met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa. Costa has also announced a visit to the Western Balkans in mid-May, following the second scheduled meeting between Vučić and Kos. According to sources, during that meeting Costa told Vučić that if the situation in the country does not change, Brussels would look for alternative interlocutors in Belgrade.
Somewhat unexpectedly, the meeting with Ursula von der Leyen and Costa did not conclude with a joint press conference. Instead, the two Brussels diplomats issued separate statements highlighting that Serbia’s future lies in the EU, but that it must be preceded by “tangible results” in fighting corruption, strengthening the rule of law, and improving media freedom. “The period of European enlargement fatigue is over,” Kos added, concluding that concrete steps are now required.
However, has official Belgrade, by failing to meet the EU’s demands, effectively signalled its own fatigue with European integration?
Internationalisation of the crisis
The answer should be sought elsewhere – in the fact that the Serbian authorities are clearly tired of the protests that have shaken the corrupt stabilocracy. Prime Minister-designate Đuro Macut has formed a new Serbian Government, with new ministers such as Education Minister Dejan Vuk Stanković and Information Minister Boris Bratina seemingly indicating a ramping up of repression against the most defiant part of Serbian society: the academic community and professional media. There is no doubt that, if the spectre of EU integration did not still hover over Nemanjina 11 and Andrićev Venac, this repression would have already shown its ugliest face.
While Serbia continued to debate the possibility of early elections, expert-led or transitional governments, or reconstruction based on the current parliamentary majority… student-cyclists set off for the heart of Europe.
“A ride to Strasbourg and the RTS blockade on one hand, and on the other, a new government with old habits – repression, cynicism, and political theatre. The students, however, chose not to wait for an invitation to the 7:30 p.m. news, but to head to where some belief in justice still remains – Strasbourg. By bicycle. Because what is left when the state, the media, and the institutions no longer function?” said Nemanja Todorović Štiplija, director of the Centre for Contemporary Politics and the European Western Balkans portal, adding that the geopolitical importance of this unusual journey exceeds mere symbolism.
Meetings with local politicians and media have shown live that the energy of the protests is alive and extends beyond Serbia’s borders. Somewhat paradoxically, the Serbian authorities themselves have triggered the internationalisation of the crisis, which followed the stampede during 15 minutes of silence at the 15 March protest.
“European institutions understand that the protests are non-violent, but what they still fail to see clearly is what isn’t shown in the media. Silent repression, crackdowns without tear gas but with consequences – withheld salaries, informal bans, pressure on the academic community, threats… This is where civil society steps in, to speak where others are silent, and to document what the authorities try to hide,” our source concluded.
May more tense than March
Radar’s sources also claim that, in previous meetings with European officials, the President of Serbia appeared somewhat uninformed about the situation in the country and unaware that certain obligations had not been fulfilled, such as the steps towards Serbia joining the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). If in future meetings he expresses surprise at the lack of progress on electoral and media legislation reforms – not to mention the selection of REM Council members – the only people more surprised will be the citizens of Serbia.
May is expected to be a stressful month for Serbia’s leadership, possibly as tense as March, as alongside António Costa and Marija (Marta) Kos, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas is also expected in Belgrade. It is telling that during her first tour of Western Balkan countries, she visited all but Belgrade and Pristina.
“Her visit comes at a time when both Serbia and Kosovo are in deep political crises and the dialogue has been completely hollowed out. Kallas could bring renewed momentum, but only if the EU finally moves from the phase of ‘expressing concern’ to concrete political action. Otherwise, the vacuum will be filled by forces that do not share European values, among which now, surprisingly, are also the United States,” said Selaković.
The publication of the questionable FSB report, which concluded the same as Serbia’s Security-Information Agency – that sonic weapons were not used on 15 March, despite numerous indicators suggesting otherwise – along with Vučić’s announced visit to Moscow for the 80th Victory Day commemoration, will certainly feature on the agenda, even if EU press offices frame the High Representative’s visit as purely ceremonial.
“The FSB report probably didn’t even convince its own author, let alone European institutions. When a regime, a member of the Council of Europe and an EU candidate, addresses police brutality through Moscow connections, that’s not a procedural error – it’s a clear message to Europe, and one Brussels won’t forget easily,” said Nemanja Todorović Štiplija.
Selaković agrees with this assessment, also expressing concern over reports of rapid and mass granting of Serbian citizenship to Russian intelligence agents and oligarchs. She argues that Serbia is not yet a security risk, but with its current trajectory and no clear EU response, it could easily become one.
While our source sees Vučić’s announcement that he will visit Moscow on 9 May as part of a familiar geopolitical performance – ritual stoking of speculation followed by a withdrawal from the visit, accompanied by much media coverage – Todorović Štiplija points out that the EU’s responses so far have been far from routine.
Not only in Vučić’s case, however, but also in that of Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico, the Prime Ministers of Hungary and Slovakia, whose attendance at the parade has also been announced. In Serbia’s case as an EU candidate, Estonian Foreign Ministry Secretary General Jonatan Vseviov was clear: “decisions come with a price,” he said, and Serbia’s will likely be the freezing of accession negotiations. Todorović Štiplija adds that the controversial visit is not an isolated incident – Serbia has for years refused to align with restrictive measures against Russia, and no matter how much it tries to compensate for its supposed neutrality by semi-public assistance to Ukraine, such gestures cannot replace a comprehensive geopolitical orientation.
Coincidentally or not, despite ratified agreements, Serbia has still not received the €111 million instalment foreseen as the first tranche of aid under the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans.
Mixed signals
A particular point of contention in Brussels is the fact that some Serbian officials have more or less openly described the six-month-long student and civil protests in Serbia as a “colour revolution” allegedly supported by the EU, coupled with calls to cut off aid to Serbian civil society and professional media. To be fair, this narrative predates the collapse of the roof at Novi Sad Railway Station – one should recall that back in December 2023, following public dissatisfaction over irregular elections, Vučić indirectly accused Germany of interfering in Serbia’s internal affairs.
(Radar, 28.04.2025)
https://radar.nova.rs/politika/srbija-evropa-vucic-alternativa-ek/